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I. INTRODUCTION
Trademarks' serve several valuable and interrelated business
functions.2 First, a trademark identifies a particular product or ser-
vice with its producer or provider.3 Second, a trademark signifies that
all goods sold under it are of equal, although not of necessarily high,
quality.4 Third, a trademark serves as a valuable vehicle for advertis-
ing a product or service.5 These basic trademark functions benefit
both businesses and consumers. Businesses benefit from the competi-
tive advantage and, hopefully, from the increased profits that invest-
ment in a trademark creates.6 Similarly, consumers benefit because
1. For the purposes of this Comment, the terms "mark" and "trademark" are used to
denote both trademarks and service marks. See Lanham Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 1053 (1988)
(allowing federal registration of service marks "in the same manner and with the same effect"
as trademarks).
2. For an extensive discussion of the functions of trademarks, see I J. MCCARTHY,
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 2-3 (2d ed. 1984).
3. See id §§ 3.2-.3.
4. See id. § 3.4(A).
5. See id § 3.5, at 115 (" 'A trademark is but a species of advertising, its purpose being to
fix the identity of the article and the name of the producer in the minds of people who see the
advertisement, so that they may afterwards use the knowledge themselves and carry it to
others having like desires and needs for such article."' (quoting Northam Warren Corp. v.
Universal Cosmetic Co., 18 F.2d 774, 774 (7th Cir. 1927))).
6. See id § 2.10, at 85 (discussing how the protection of trademarks "'rest[s] on the
social interest in protecting primarily . . . the businessman who has gained a strategic
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trademarks both reduce the cost to the consumer of gathering infor-
mation about products7 and encourage businesses to produce quality
goods.'
The law of trademarks protects both consumers and businesses
from trademark infringement.9 Businesses are protected because of
the fundamental unfairness of allowing an infringing user to profit
from a legitimate user's efforts.10  Moreover, when more than one
product bears the same or similar trademark, consumers may confuse
the products and mistakenly purchase the wrong one. Accordingly,
the law of trademarks also serves to ensure that consumers will obtain
the product that they actually intend to purchase.II
The determination of the territorial scope of trademark rights
has caused substantial confusion among the courts. Under the com-
mon law, a party acquires the right to a trademark by using it in
commerce. 2 As a general rule, the first or "senior" user to sell its
advantage through building up of good will, against unfair practices by competitors who desire
to poach on this good will'" (quoting Eastern Wine Ccrp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d
955, 958 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 758 (1943))).
7. See id § 2.1(B)(2). Professor McCarthy refers to this as the "reducing customer's
search costs" function. He writes: "The point is that trademarks reduce the customer's cost of
acquiring information about products and services. Information, and the time required to
acquire it, are not costless." Id. § 2.1(B)(2), at 47.
8. See id § 2. 1(BX I). McCarthy refers to this as the "quality encouragement function"
of trademarks. He writes: "Trademarks fix responsibility. Without marks, a seller's mistakes
or low quality products would be untraceable to their source. Therefore, trademarks create an
incentive to keep up a good reputation for a predictable quality of goods." Id § 2.1(B)(1), at
45.
9. See S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG.
SERV. 1274, 1274.
The purpose underlying any trade-mark statute is twofold. One is to protect the
public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular
trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for and
wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of a trade-mark has spent energy, time,
and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his
investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats. This is the well-
established rule of law protecting both the public and the trade-mark owner.
Id.
10. See 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 2.11 (characterizing trademark infringement as a
type of unjust enrichment).
11. See id § 2.12(A), at 88 (discussing how trademark infringement" 'deprives consumers
of their ability to distinguish among the goods of competing manufacturers'" (quoting
Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 n. 14 (1982))).
12. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916) (The right to use a
trademark "grows out of use, not mere adoption."); see also 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2,
§ 16.1, at 720 ("Ownership of trademark rights in the United States is obtained by actual use
of a symbol to identify the goods or services... ."). But see Lanham Act § l(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1051(b) (1988) (This Section allows certain parties, who have a "bona fide intention" to use a




trademarked product or service within the territorial boundaries of
the United States has the superior right to use the mark.' 3 In certain
instances, however, a subsequent or "junior" user of the same or simi-
lar trademark may have rights that are superior to those of any other
user in the same geographically limited area.' 4 Because trademark
rights are exclusive, only one user is entitled to use a particular trade-
mark in a given geographical area.' 5 Therefore, where one user pos-
sesses the valid right, any other users within that geographical area of
use are infringers who can be enjoined from the continued use of that
trademark. 16
The test for determining trademark infringement and, therefore,
a user's entitlement to an injunction is whether there exists a "likeli-
hood of confusion" between the user's and the infringer's marks.'
7 If
13. Hanover, 240 U.S. at 415 ("In the ordinary case of parties competing under the same
mark in the same market, it is correct to say that prior appropriation settles the question.").
14. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 100 (1918). The Court
noted:
It would be a perversion of the rule of priority to give it such an application in
our broadly extended country that an innocent party who had in good faith
employed a trade-mark in one state, and by the use of it had built up a trade
there, being the first appropriator in that jurisdiction, might afterwards be
prevented from using it, with consequent injury to his trade and good will, at the
instance of one who theretofore had employed the same mark, but only in other
and remote jurisdictions, upon the ground that its first employment happened to
antedate that of the first-mentioned trader.
Id
15. Hanover, 240 U.S. at 413.
16. See, e.g., Wiener King, Inc. v. Wiener King Corp., 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 353, 356-57
(3d Cir. 1976) (granting the junior user a nationwide injunction against the senior user with
the exception of the senior user's area of trademark protection), cert denied, 430 U.S. 916
(1977); Sweetarts v. Sunline, Inc., 380 F.2d 923, 929 (8th Cir. 1967) (holding that the senior
user was entitled to an injunction in the areas in which it had established sufficient market
penetration).
17. For a list of cases supporting this proposition, see 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2,
§ 23.1(A), at 42-43 nn.1-2. For there to be a likelihood of confusion, there must be a
"probability" of confusion between the legitimate user's and the infringing user's marks. Id
§ 23.1(C), at 45. This requires more than a mere "possibility" of confusion, id, but less than
proof of "actual" confusion, id § 23.2(A), at 50.
The inquiry into what constitutes trademark infringement is actually a three-step process.
First, it must be determined whether there is a likelihood of confusion between the trademarks
with respect to any similarity of appearance, phonetic quality, meaning, or context in which
the trademarks appear. See generally 2 J. McCARTHY, supra note 2, §§ 23.3-.10, .18.
Second, it must be determined that there is a likelihood of confusion with respect to the
kind of products, services, or businesses involved. For example, where the products, services,
or businesses are in direct competition, the senior user is presumptively entitled to protection
from the junior user's appropriation. See Playboy Enters. v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc.,
687 F.2d 563, 569 (2d Cir. 1982) (senior and junior users were both engaged in publishing
"sex-oriented" magazines); American Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson Chem. Co., 589 F.2d
103, 107 (2d Cir. 1978) (senior and junior users were both operating in the roach trap market).
On the other hand, where the products, services, or businesses are not in direct competition,
1990] 1077
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1075
more than one user is entitled to use the same or similar trademark,
the problem is to determine the territorial area in which each has
rights. This inquiry into the territorial scope of trademark rights is
primarily a determination of the geographical area in which there
exists a likelihood of confusion between the trademarks of the legiti-
mate user and the infringing user."8 If there is a likelihood of confu-
sion within a particular geographical area, the party with superior
rights can enjoin the other from using that trademark within that par-
ticular area.19
Historically, three theories have been used to delineate the terri-
torial scope of protection. These theories or "zones of protection" are
the zones of actual market penetration, reputation, and natural expan-
sion. The "zone of actual market penetration" is the geographical
area in which the legitimate user has made sufficient sales of its goods
to create a likelihood of confusion between its product and the
infringer's product.20 Outside of this area of actual market penetra-
tion, it is also possible that a trademark is so well known that a likeli-
hood of confusion is created by the continued use of the mark by
more than one party. The geographical area into which the trade-
mark's renown is carried by advertising or word of mouth is the
"zone of reputation."'" Finally, there exists a "zone of natural expan-
sion," a geographical area to which the courts extend trademark pro-
tection in order to allow a growing business room to further expand.22
The courts have difficulty, however, when confronted with the
problem of determining the territorial scope of each of these zones of
protection. Courts do not always clearly indicate which theory they
courts will determine whether they are sufficiently related to create a likelihood of confusion.
See generally 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 24.3. Courts have devised a variety of tests to
measure whether the goods, services, or businesses are sufficiently related. See generally id
§§ 24.6-.11.
Finally, even if the marks are similar in appearance and are used in connection with the
same type of goods, there is an additional requirement that the trademarks be used in the same
geographical area. See generally id. §§ 26.1-.12. Therefore, assuming that the first two steps
are satisfied, the third step requires a determination of the territory within which there exists a
likelihood of confusion.
18. See Treece, Security for Federally Registered Mark Owners Against Subsequent Users,
39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1008, 1020 (1971).
19. See, e.g., Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 360 (2d Cir.
1959) (refusing to enjoin an infringing user because no likelihood of confusion had been
proven).
20. For a more thorough discussion of the zone of actual market penetration, see infra
Section II(B)(l).
21. For a more thorough discussion of the zone of reputation, see infra Section II(B)(2).




are applying.2" This confusion can be seen when courts use the termi-
nology generally associated with one zone of protection in order to
describe another zone. It is further reflected by the incorporation of
factors that are used to measure different zones within the test for a
single zone. In addition, the courts do not agree on which factors
should be considered in delineating the territorial scope of trademark
rights within each of these three zones.24
The problems created by this confusion ultimately create a
vicious circle. When past decisions do not clearly indicate which of
the three zones of protection has been applied, a court is more likely
to apply the wrong theory. Furthermore, when a court applies the
wrong theory, it is less likely to know what factors to consider in
delineating the territorial extent of trademark rights. When a court
fails to consider the proper factors, it is less likely to offer clear rea-
sons for its decision. This in turn makes it more difficult for a succes-
sor court to apply existing authority correctly to new factual
situations, thereby resulting in inconsistent decisions. Completing the
circle, these inconsistent decisions further distort the doctrine. As a
result, courts determining the territorial extent of trademark rights
must be clear on which theory of protection they are applying. To
reduce this confusion, a clear set of factors must be created in order to
test the extent of the various zones of protection.
Three courts have devised tests designed to measure the territo-
rial extent of trademark rights.25 Predictably, these tests confuse the
three theories; each test incorporates factors that are used to measure
the extent of more than one zone.26 These tests have exacerbated the
existing confusion because later decisions have simply applied the
tests without considering the underlying reasoning. The United
States Supreme Court has repeatedly denied the certiorari review
needed to untangle the confusion.'
Section II of this Comment outlines the basic trademark law nec-
essary for a proper understanding of the problems involved in deter-
mining the territorial scope of trademark protection. The Section
discusses the zones of protection and how they fit into the common
23. See infra Section III(A).
24. See infra Section III(B).
25. See Natural Footwear Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383 (3d Cir.), cert
denied, 474 U.S. 920 (1985); Sweetarts v. Sunline, Inc., 380 F.2d 923 (8th Cir. 1967); see also
Weiner King, Inc. v. Wiener King Corp., 615 F.2d 512 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
26. See infra Section III(B).
27. See, e.g., Natural Footwear Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920 (1985); Wiener King, Inc. v. Wiener King Corp., 192 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 353 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 916 (1977).
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law and statutory, framework of trademark protection. Section III
presents the three tests that have been devised to determine the terri-
torial extent of trademark rights, and it explores the underlying con-
fusion. The Section further attempts to reconcile the test factors with
the existing theories of protection. Section IV argues that a distinc-
tion between the zone of actual market penetration and the zone of
reputation may no longer be applicable; it then proposes factors that
should be considered in delineating the territorial scope of a user's
trademark rights. Finally, Section V concludes that the adoption of
these proposed factors would likely decrease the confusion that is
prevalent in today's trademark law and that the use of these new pro-
posed factors would enable the courts to more easily apply the doc-
trine developed in prior cases to new factual situations.
II. A BACKGROUND FOR UNDERSTANDING TERRITORIAL RIGHTS
In order to understand the problems involved in determining the
territorial extent of trademark rights, it is first necessary to under-
stand the basic principles of trademark law. This Section presents the
common law as a background for understanding the manner in which
trademark rights are acquired. The zones of protection, including
actual market penetration, reputation, and natural expansion, are also
discussed. Finally, the statutory scheme of federal trademark protec-
tion is presented, and its connection to the common law is explained.
A. The Common Law
The threshold question for determining the territorial scope of
trademark rights is whether more than one party is entitled to use the
same or similar trademark. The answer to this question is derived
from the common law.28 Under the common law, trademark rights
are acquired through actual use. 29 The right to use a trademark is,
exclusive-within any given area, there can be only one user of a par-
ticular trademark. 30 Accordingly, the party possessing the exclusive
right to use a particular trademark may protect that right by
enjoining other users from operating within its protected territory.31
28. This Comment focuses on the determination of the territorial scope of trademark
rights under general common law principles and does not discuss the differing applications of
these principles by the various states.
29. See supra note 12.
30. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916).
31. See supra note 16.
This Comment focuses on the right to an injunctive remedy. A party who is entitled to an
injunction may, in certain circumstances, be able to collect damages from the infringing party.
See Lanham Act §§ 32, 35, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1117 (1988).
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The user of a trademark also has the right to expand into unoccupied
territory and establish exclusive rights by being the first user in that
territory.3 2 Finally, the first or "senior" user3 3 generally has rights
that are superior to the rights of all subsequent or "junior" users34 of
the same or similar trademark. 35 In certain instances, however, a jun-
ior user can establish rights that are superior to those rights of all
other users (including the senior user) within a limited geographical
area.
36
The test for injunctive relief is whether there exists a "likelihood
of confusion" between the user's and the infringer's marks. 37 If a jun-
ior user makes use of a trademark that is "confusingly similar" to the
senior user's trademark and this use occurs within the territory
already occupied by the senior user, then the junior user can be
enjoined.38 Conversely, if the junior user acquires a valid common
law trademark in a different geographical area and use by another
within that area would create a likelihood of confusion, then the jun-
ior user can obtain an injunction.39
The United States Supreme Court established the principle that
more than one user can possess a valid trademark right in the same or
similar trademark in the landmark cases of Hanover Star Milling Co.
32. See 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 26.5, at 293.
33. The "senior" user of a trademark is the first user to adopt and use a trademark within
the territorial boundaries of the United States. IAL § 26.1, at 282.
34. The "junior" user of a trademark is the user who adopts and uses a mark after the
senior user's prior use of the same or similar mark. Id.
35. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 415 (1916).
36. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 100 (1918); Hanover, 240
U.S. at 415, 419.
37. For a discussion of the likelihood-of-confusion standard, see supra notes 17-19 and
accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Sweetarts v. Sunline, Inc., 380 F.2d 923, 929 (8th Cir. 1967).
.39. See, e.g., Wiener King, Inc. v. Wiener King Corp., 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 353, 356-57
(3d Cir. 1976), cert denied, 430 U.S. 916 (1977).
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v. Metcalf4 and United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co.41 In
40. 240 U.S. 403 (1916). In Hanover, a dispute arose concerning various parties' rights to
use the mark "Tea Rose" on their flour products. The senior user began using the mark in
1872 in the Ohio area. Id. at 409. By the time of the suit, the senior user had expanded its
sales into Pennsylvania and Massachusetts. Id Shortly after its incorporation in 1885, the
junior user, without knowledge of the senior user's prior use, began using the "Tea Rose"
mark on its flour product. Id. at 410. By the time of the action, the junior user had made sales
in several southern states including Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and Florida. Id The
senior user sought, among other things, an injunction against the junior user's continued use of
the "Tea Rose" trademark.
The court refused to uphold the injunctions granted by the two district courts, stating
that:
In the ordinary case of parties competing under the same mark in the same
market, it is correct to say that prior appropriation settles the question. But
where two parties independently are employing the same mark upon goods of the
same class, but in separate markets wholly remote the one from the other, the
question of prior appropriation is legally insignificant, unless at least it appear
that the second adopter has selected the mark with some design inimical to the
interests of the first user, such as to take the benefit of the reputation of his goods,
to forestall the extension of his trade, or the like.
Id at 415. The Court further wrote:
And when it appears, as it does, that the Hanover Company [the junior user] in
good faith and without notice of the Allen & Wheeler mark [the mark of the
senior user] has expended much money and effort in building up its trade in the
south-eastern market, so that "Tea Rose" there means Hanover Company's flour
and nothing else, the Allen & Wheeler Company is estopped to assert trade-mark
infringement as to that territory.
The extent and character of that territory, and its remoteness from that in
which the Allen & Wheeler mark is known, are circumstances to be considered.
Id at 419-20.
41. 248 U.S. 90 (1918). In Rectanus, the Court reasserted the Hanover doctrine in a
slightly different factual context. The Rectanus dispute arose over the right to use the
trademark "Rex" on pharmaceutical products. The senior user first used the mark in
Massachusetts in 1877. Id. at 94. Until shortly before the time of the action, the senior user
had done little to expand its sales beyond the New England states. Id. at 98. The junior user,
without knowledge of the senior user's prior use, adopted the mark in Louisville, Kentucky in
1883, and it confined its use of the mark to that area. Id. at 94-95.
This case differs from Hanover because the senior user in Rectanus had already entered
the junior user's sales territory. Conversely, in Hanover, the senior user neither entered nor
had plans to enter the junior user's market area. The Court, relying on Hanover, refused to
enjoin the junior user:
Mrs. Regis and her firm [the senior users], having during a long period of years
confined their use of the "Rex" mark to a limited territory wholly remote from
that in controversy, must be held to have taken the risk jhat some innocent party
might in the meantime hit upon the same mark, apply it to goods of similar
character, and expend money and effort in building up a trade under it; and since
it appears that Rectanus [the junior user] in good faith, and without notice of any
prior use by others, selected and used the "Rex" mark, and by the expenditure of
money and effort succeeded in building up a local but valuable trade under it in
Louisville and vicinity before petitioner entered the field, so that "Rex" had come
to be recognized there as the "trade signature" of Rectanus and of respondent as
his successor, petitioner is estopped to set up their continued use of the mark in
that territory as an infringement of the Regis trade-mark.
Id. at 103. Thus, the Court refused to enjoin the junior user. However, the Court did not
1082
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these cases, the Court set forth the principle that a "good faith" junior
user of a trademark in a "remote area" could not be enjoined in that
remote area by a senior user of the same or similar trademark. The
two elements of "good faith" '42 and "remoteness, ' 43 however, were
considered essential to the establishment of a common law trademark
right by a junior user. This doctrine, often referred to as the Tea-
Rose/Rectanus doctrine,44 has not only been consistently followed, 45
but it has also been expanded to allow the junior user to enjoin the
senior user.' The premise of the Tea-Rose/Rectanus doctrine is that
the right to exclusive use of a trademark often depends upon relative,
rather than absolute, priority of use.47
enjoin the senior user within the junior user's market area because the junior user did not seek
such relief. Id at 99, 104.
42. The "good faith" element has generally been defined to mean that, at the time the
junior user first employed the trademark in connection with its goods, it was "without notice
or knowledge" of the senior user's prior appropriation. See 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2,
§ 26.3.
43. The "remoteness" element has been interpreted to test whether there existed a
likelihood of confusion between the marks of the senior and junior user at the time the junior
user first adopted its mark. Remoteness does not necessarily require geographical distance.
Id § 26.1, at 288.
44. See id § 26.1(B)-(D).
45. See, e.g., Sweetarts v. Sunline, Inc., 380 F.2d 923 (8th Cir. 1967); Weiner King, Inc. v.
Wiener King Corp., 615 F.2d 512 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
46. See, eg., Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Square Deal Mkt. Co., 206 F.2d 482, 486 (D.C. Cir.
1953) (granting the junior user an injunction against the senior user within the junior user's
market area), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 937 (1954).
47. This analysis presupposes that the user who claims an infringement of its trademark
possesses a valid trademark. The threshold question in the determination of trademark
infringement is therefore whether the alleged trademark owner has established a valid
trademark. Without a trademark, there can be no infringement.
The validity of a trademark requires that "the public recognize] [the alleged owner's]
symbol as identifying his goods or services and distinguishing them from those of others." 1 J.
MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 15. I(A), at 657. The validity of a trademark can be demonstrated
in one of two ways. Under the first alternative, the alleged owner can demonstrate that the
symbol is "inherently distinctive." Id For a thorough discussion of "inherently distinctive
marks" as distinguished from marks that are not inherently distinctive, see id. § 11.
Under the second alternative, if the symbol is not "inherently distinctive," the alleged
owner can demonstrate that the symbol has become distinctive by proving that the symbol has
acquired a "secondary meaning." Id. § 15.1(A), at 657. For example, descriptive marks,
geographically descriptive marks, and personal name marks are types of trademarks that
require proof of secondary meaning. For a more expansive, but not quite complete
categorization of the types of marks that require proof of secondary meaning, see id. § 7.14
(designs and symbols that are not inherently distinctive), id. § 7.31 (product and container'
shapes that are not inherently distinctive), id. § 8.2 (trade dress and packaging), id. § 9.1
(corporate, business, and professional names which are descriptive, geographically descriptive,
or personal name marks), id. § 10.2 (titles of single literary works), id. § 10.3 (descriptive titles
of a literary series), id § 11.9 (descriptive marks), id. § 13.2 (personal name marks), and id.
§ 14.5 (geographically descriptive marks).
Although there does not appear to be a single, all encompassing definition of "secondary
meaning," the basic test is whether the public has come to associate the trademarked good
19901 1083
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B. The Zones of Protection
In determining whether more than one party is entitled to con-
current use of the same or similar trademark, a court must make a
factual determination 8 of the territorial extent of a senior user's
rights at the time the junior user adopted its mark.49 Zones of protec-
tion have been devised by the courts to delineate the territorial scope
of the respective users' rights. These zones are: (1) the zone of actual
market penetration; (2) the zone of reputation; and (3) the zone of
natural expansion. In addition, a fourth zone, delimited by state
boundary lines, has been suggested.50
1. THE ZONE OF ACTUAL MARKET PENETRATION
The zone of actual market penetration or actual market use
"include[s] those areas in which the [trademarked] goods or services
are sold, and usually the area in which consumers reside who custom-
arily purchase the goods or services." '5 To establish trademark rights
with a unique but anonymous source. Id. § 15.2(D). See generally id. § 15.2 (discussing
various definitions of secondary meaning).
The determination of the territorial scope of these secondary meaning marks requires a
slight departure from the traditional Tea-Rose/Rectanus analysis. See id. §§ 26.10-.11
(discussing the territorial extent of secondary meaning marks under the common law); id
§§ 26.16-. 17 (discussing the territorial extent of secondary meaning marks under the Lanham
Act). Because a mark must acquire a secondary meaning before it can qualify as a trademark,
it follows that a user of a secondary meaning mark can only acquire trademark rights and the
accompanying right to an injunction in those areas in which a mark has acquired a secondary
meaning before the date of the junior user's first use. See, e.g., Food Fair, 206 F.2d at 484
(holding that the trial court did not err in finding that the senior user had failed to establish a
secondary meaning for its mark in the junior user's trade area at the time the junior user first
adopted its mark); Katz Drug Co. v. Katz, 188 F.2d 696, 700 (8th Cir. 1951) (refusing to
enjoin the junior user of a secondary meaning mark where the senior user did not prove that its
mark had acquired a secondary meaning in the junior user's trade area prior to the time that
the junior user first used the mark).
The doctrine of the territorial scope of secondary meaning marks is in accord with the
likelihood-of-confusion standard. If there exists a likelihood of confusion between the
legitimate user's mark and the infringing user's mark, it follows that the public must have
recognized the legitimate user's mark. See Alexander & Coil, Geographic Rights in
Trademarks and Service Marks, 68 TRADEMARK REP. 101, 107 (1978) (stating that "[i]t is
fundamental that there will be no customer confusion unless the senior user's mark is either (1)
inherently distinctive, or (2) if not inherently distinctive, has acquired secondary meaning").
For a discussion of the connection between the doctrines of secondary meaning and likelihood
of confusion, see 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 15.3.
48. See, e.g., Federal Glass Co. v. Loshin, 224 F.2d 100, 102 (2d Cir. 1955).
49. See Hotel Sherman, Inc. v. Harlow, 186 F. Supp. 618, 620-21 (S.D. Cal. 1960). See
generally 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, §§ 26.1-.12 (discussing the "critical date" of the
junior user's first use).
50. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 426 (1916) (Holmes, J.,
concurring).
51. Alexander & Coil, supra note 47, at 104; see also Lunsford, Geographical Scope of
Registered Rights-Then and Now, 61 TRADEMARK REP. 411, 414 (1971) (describing
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in a particular area, the old common law rule only required minimal
market penetration through sales of the trademarked product or ser-
vice. 2 Subsequently, however, the minimum requirement of market
penetration has been raised to require a "real likelihood of confusion"
between the trademarks of the legitimate user and the infringing
user.5 3 Accordingly, any test for significant market penetration is
simply a method of proving a likelihood of confusion. The United
States Courts of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit" and the Third Cir-
cuit" are split on the precise factors that should be considered in
determining whether a party claiming trademark rights in a particular
area has the required quantum of market penetration. The factors in
dispute include: actual sales volume; the potential market for the
trademarked product; growth of sales; passage of time since there
were significant sales; and the amount of advertising.5 6
2. THE ZONE OF REPUTATION
Beyond the geographical area of actual sales and the residences
of customers, there is also the area into which a "mark's reputation
has been carried by word of mouth and/or by advertisements." ' ,
This area is commonly referred to as the zone of reputation. 8 Theo-
trademark use as "wherever the goods or services bearing it are offered for sale"); Treece,
supra note 18, at 1013 (defining location of use as "the area in which consumers reside who
customarily purchase goods and services"); Comment, The Scope of Territorial Protection of
Trademarks, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 781, 787-88 (1970).
52. See Sweet Sixteen Co. v. Sweet "16" Shop, Inc., 15 F.2d 920, 925 (8th Cir. 1926)
("[W]hile there must, of course, be some user in the trade in the disputed field of trade, the
quantum thereof need not be large.").
53. See Sweetarts v. Sunline, Inc., 380 F.2d 923, 929 (8th Cir. 1967) ("Though the market
penetration need not be large to entitle plaintiff to protection .... it must be significant enough
to pose the real likelihood of confusion among the consumers in that area between the
products of plaintiff and the products of defendants.").
54. Sweetarts v. Sunline, Inc., 380 F.2d 923 (8th Cir. 1967). For a thorough discussion of
this case, see infra notes 148-56 & 171-82 and accompanying text.
55. Natural Footwear, Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383 (3d Cir. 1985). For
a thorough discussion of this case, see infra notes 131-47 & 183-98 and accompanying text.
56. For a more thorough comparison of the different factors adopted by the Sweetarts and
Natural Footwear courts, see infra notes 178-82 & 192-98 and accompanying text.
57. Alexander & Coil, supra note 47, at 105.
58. See 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, §§ 26.6-.7 (discussing the extent of the trademark
user's reputation); Lunsford, supra note 51, at 414 (noting that a senior user's rights are often
protected in areas "where his goods are advertised or known by reputation"); Treece, supra
note 18, at 1014 (describing the area in which a firm's "reputation [has been] carried by
advertisements and the word of mouth of consumers" as an area that is often protected from
infringement); Comment, supra note 51, at 789 (referring to this area as the trademark owner's
"zone of advertising and reputation").
An excellent example of how a user's reputation can extend the scope of its trademark
rights can be found in the Stork Club case. Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348 (9th
Cir. 1948). There, the court made clear that it was willing to enjoin an infringing user where
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retically, however, trademark protection should not extend beyond
the area of actual market penetration. Moreover, where trademark
rights are acquired only by the use of the trademark - use requiring
sales - it follows that a mark is not "used" in an area in which there
have been no sales.59
In Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf," the United States
Supreme Court realized that advertising had the potential for spread-
ing business goodwill beyond the areas of actual market sales.6" The
Court alluded to the possibility that, in certain instances, the protec-
tion of trademarks could extend beyond the zone of actual market
penetration: "Into whatever markets the use of a trademark has
extended, or its meaning has become known, there will the manufac-
turer or trader whose trade is pirated by an infringing use be entitled
to protection and redress."
'62
Professor McCarthy agrees that in the modem American mar-
ketplace, the combination of extensive advertising and ambulatory
customers has served to spread the reputation of many trademarked
products. He noted:
Obviously, media such as national magazines, newspapers, radio,
and television can indeed carry the mark thousands of miles away
from the outlet where goods or services under the mark are offered
for sale.
In addition, the purchasing buyer class for services such as
hotels, motels, and restaurants are ambulatory and on the move
back and forth across the nation. They may carry the reputation
of the mark thousands of miles away from the actual outlet....
the legitimate user's reputation extended into the infringer's area at the time the infringer
adopted its mark.
In Stork Club, the senior user was the owner of a famous night club in New York City
that first used the mark "Stork Club" in 1929. By the time the junior user began using the
mark in 1945 in connection with a small cocktail lounge in San Francisco, the senior user had
already engaged in nationwide advertising and its mark enjoyed a nationwide reputation.
Although recognizing that there was no direct competition between the two users, the court
enjoined the junior user. The court wrote:
[I]t was at first a debatable point whether a merchant's good will, indicated by his
mark, could extend beyond such goods as he sold....
"However, it has of recent years been recognized that a merchant may have
a sufficient economic interest in the use of his mark outside the field of his own
exploitation to justify interposition by a court."
Id. at 354-55 (quoting Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 973-74 (2d Cir. 1928)).
59. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 416 (1916) ("[T]he mark, of
itself, cannot travel to markets where there is no article to wear the badge and no trader to
offer the article.").
60. 240 U.S. 403 (1916).
61. Id. at 415. It must be remembered that in 1916 there was no "television, national
magazines [or] commercial airlines transportation." Lunsford, supra note 51, at 425.
62. Hanover, 240 U.S. at 415-16 (emphasis added).
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Mail-order sales are another method of carrying the mark to
areas far away from the actual sales place of a product.
The combination of national advertising and ambulatory buy-
ers may carry the reputation of a mark into places far away from
the actual outlet.63
From the perspective of the likelihood-of-confusion standard, the
protection of the zone of reputation is reasonable. This protection is
reasonable because when the reputation of a trademark has spread
and become sufficiently well known in an area outside the area of
actual market penetration, there is an increased likelihood that the
consuming public will confuse the infringer's product or service with
that of the legitimate user." Therefore, in order to protect both con-
sumers and businesses, trademark rights should extend to this zone of
reputation.
3. THE ZONE OF NATURAL EXPANSION
Another concept that has emerged in the determination of trade-
mark territory is the zone of natural expansion. This zone is a geo-
graphical area, located outside both the zones of actual market
penetration and reputation, into which a trademark owner has the
potential to expand.65 Trademark users are given protection within
this area based upon the policy of granting some "breathing space" to
legitimate users. 66 Courts have historically applied this doctrine only
to a senior user's territory,67 but more recently, they have extended
this protection to junior users.68
63. 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 26.6(A), at 296-97 (footnotes omitted).
64. See, e-g., Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 356, 358 (9th Cir. 1948). For
a more thorough discussion of the Stork Club case, see supra note 58.
65. 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 26.8, at 301; see also Alexander & Coil, supra note 47,
at 105-06 (The area of natural or probable expansion is a "legal fiction created by judicial
decisions to preserve space for future growth if expansion was reasonably foreseeable at the
date of the junior user's adoption."); Lunsford, supra note 51, at 414 ("A senior user's rights
may be protected in areas beyond his actual selling zone ... to which the senior user can
demonstrate a probable extension of his operations .. "); Treece, supra note 18, at 1017 (An
area of probable expansion is a "geographical area not yet penetrated by the first user at the
time a local user adopted its trade symbol but which apparently will be entered by him in the
foreseeable future.").
66. 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 26.8, at 301-02.
67. See id. §§ 26.8-.9.
68. Spartan Food Sys. v. HFS Corp., 813 F.2d 1279, 1283 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that
while a junior user could be entitled to a zone of natural expansion, the junior user had not
proven any attempts to expand its trade area).
It must be realized, of course, that a junior user who has plans to expand into an area in
which the senior user has already established a market could not obtain an injunction against
the senior user for trademark infringement, absent a showing of bad faith on the part of the
senior user. This is because a junior user cannot acquire rights that are superior to the senior
user's rights within the senior user's area of use. See supra notes 12-16 & 28-47 and
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The zone of natural expansion was first alluded to in Hanover
69
when the Court distinguished the facts of that case from "a case
where the junior appropriation [sic] of a trademark is occupying terri-
tory that would probably be reached by the prior user in the natural
expansion of his trade."' 70 Some courts, however, have criticized the
zone of natural expansion. In addition to criticisms based upon the
impreciseness of the doctrine, 7' courts have attacked the zone of natu-
ral expansion as unnecessary in light of the availability of federal
registration. 72 Furthermore, courts have questioned the. fairness of
penalizing a good faith junior user in a remote area simply because it
happens to stand in the unforeseen expansion path of the senior
user.
73
Perhaps the major practical consideration in applying the zone of
natural expansion theory is the determination of the territorial scope
of this zone. Because this zone is merely a legal fiction,74 courts are
not capable of quantitatively measuring its territorial scope. The
party that invokes the doctrine wants the zone to be as large as possi-
ble, but the opposing party wants it to be as small as possible. In
Weiner King, Inc. v. Wiener King Corp.,7 the United States Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals 76 set forth several factors for courts to
consider in determining the size of a user's zone of expansion. These
accompanying text. This doctrine, therefore, is only applicable to junior users in cases where
there is a federal registration involved; it is only in these situations that a court may be
required to adjudicate trademark rights in areas in which the trademark has not been
employed either through sales or reputation. For a discussion of concurrent registrations
under the Lanham Act, see infra notes 116-27 and accompanying text.
69. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916).
70. Id. at 420.
71. See beef& brew, inc. v. Beef& Brew, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 179, 185 (D. Or. 1974) ("[T]he
zone of expansion doctrine has a more than usually unclear place in the law of unfair
competition. This is so because the doctrine is more than usually imprecise and yet very
powerful.").
72. Raxton Corp. v. Anania Assocs., Inc., 635 F.2d 924, 930 (1st Cir. 1980).
73. Id. at 930-31.
There is a possible reconciliation to this seeming unfairness. In Katz Drug Co. v. Katz,
89 F. Supp. 528, 534 (E.D. Mo. 1950), aff'd, 188 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1951), the district court
argued that many of the cases decided under the zone of natural expansion theory had either
some element of bad faith on the part of the junior user or some showing that the senior user's
reputation had extended into the junior user's area. Id. This suggests that a separate zone of
expansion theory may be unnecessary because these cases could have been decided under the
traditional Tea-Rose/Rectanus doctrine which requires a junior user to prove both elements of
good faith and remoteness in order to prove its entitlement to a trademark. For a discussion of
the Tea.Rose/Rectanus doctrine, see supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
74. 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 26.8, at 303.
75. 615 F.2d 512 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
76. In 1982, the number of United States Courts of Appeals increased from 12 to 13 with
the addition of the Federal Circuit. Simultaneously, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
was abolished. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25; see
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factors included: previous business activity, previous expansion, dom-
inance of contiguous area, presently planned expansion, and possible
market penetration by means of goods brought in from other areas.77
4. STATE BOUNDARIES
In his concurring opinion in Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf,
Justice Holmes proposed a fourth zone delimited by state boundary
lines.78 Justice Holmes indicated that the use of a trademark in one
portion of a state created rights throughout the state. He wrote: "I
do not believe that a trademark established in Chicago could be used
by a competitor in some other part of Illinois on the ground that it
was not known there. I think that if it is good in one part of the state,
it is good in all.
' 79
Nevertheless, a majority of courts have rejected this theory and
held that separate trade areas may exist within state boundary lines.80
Rejection of this fourth zone seems proper in light of the fact that
commercial markets are not circumscribed by state political bounda-
ries. Professor McCarthy has noted that the "Justice Holmes dicta
appears grossly unrealistic when one considers that advertising, com-
munications and perambulating consumers show no heed to political
boundaries."'"
In spite of these realities, many of the courts that have rejected
Justice Holmes' dicta continue to adjudicate trademark rights on a
state-by-state basis.8 2 There are at least two logical explanations for
this seeming contradiction. First, where a party seeking to prove its
area of trademark protection categorizes its evidence, such as sales
data or advertising, on a state-by-state basis, a court has no choice but
S. REp. No. 275, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CONG. CODE & ADMIN. NEWS
11, 12.
77. Weiner King, 615 F.2d'at 523 (citing In re Beatrice Foods Co., 429 F.2d 466, 475
(C.C.P.A. 1970)). For a more thorough discussion of these factors, see infra notes 211-20 and
accompanying text.
78. Hanover 'Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403; 426 (1916) (Holmes, J.,
concurring).
79. Id
80. See, *eg., Katz Drug Co. v. Katz, 188 F.2d 696, 700 (8th Cir. 1951) (holding that two
users of the tradename "Katz," using the name in connection with the operation of drug
stores, were entitled to operate within the state of Missouri). But see, e.g., Federal Glass Co. v.
Loshin, 224 F.2d 100, 102 (2d Cir. 1955) (stating that in determining the territorial extent of a
tradename, "the nairowest limit that could reasonably be imposed today would be that of a
state").
81. 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 26.12, at 311.
82. See, e.g., Natural Footwear Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383, 1398 n.34
(3d Cir. 1985); Wrist-Rocket Mfg. Co. v. Saunders Archery Co., 578 F.2d 727, 732 (8th Cir.
1978).
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to consider the limited evidence. 83 Second, in certain situations, state
boundaries may more accurately reflect the market area for the prod-
uct because of the nature of the product and its associated channels of
distribution.
8 4
C. The Lanham Act
As modem businesses expanded their operations beyond limited
geographical areas and engaged in nationwide activity,"5 the common
law doctrine that limited trademark protection to the areas of actual
market penetration, reputation, and natural expansion became inade-
quate.8 6 The territorial scope of trademark protection needed to be
enlarged87 in order to enable entrepreneurs to expand growing busi-
nesses without the fear that subsequent users would preempt their
trademark rights. Thus, the Lanham Act"8 was passed "[t]o modern-
ize the [older] trade-mark statutes so that they will conform to legiti-
mate present-day business practice."89
The Lanham Act filled this need for increased trademark protec-
tion by expanding the territorial scope of trademark protection
beyond the common law zones of protectionY° Registration91 of a
trademark under the Lanham Act enables a registrant 92 to establish
83. Natural Footwear, 760 F.2d at 1398 n.34.
84. Wrist-Rocket, 578 F.2d at 732.
85. See S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG.
SERV. 1274, 1277 (stating that "trade is no longer local, but is national").
86. See Lunsford, supra note 51, at 415 (In the absence of a registration, a senior user who
discovers a junior user during the course of his expansion is forced into one of several
undesirable options, which include: "(1) purchasing the junior user's mark, (2) proceeding at
his own peril, (3) adopting a new mark, [or] (4) staying out of the territory." (footnotes
omitted)).
87. See S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG.
SERV. 1274, 1276 ("[I]deas concerning trade-mark protection have changed ... and the
statutes have not kept pace with the commercial development.").
88. Ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988)).
89. S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV.
1274, 1276.
90. 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 26.13, at 313.
91. Lanham Act § 1(a)-(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)-(b) (1988) (providing that, pursuant to
Subsection (l)(a), "[t]he owner of a trade-mark used in commerce" or pursuant to Subsection
(l)(b), "[a] person who has a bona fide intention, under circumstances showing the good faith
of such person," may apply to register its trademark on the principal register in the Patent and
Trademark Office).
92. For the purposes of this Comment, references to "registration" and "registrant" refer
to registrations or parties who have registered their marks on the principal register, as opposed
to the supplemental register, of the Patent and Trademark Office. See Lanham Act §§ 23-28,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1091-96 (1988) (the provisions governing registration on the supplemental
register).
Registration on the supplemental register does not confer upon the registrant many of the
benefits of registration on the principal register. Section 26 of the Lanham Act provides:
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trademark rights throughout either the United States or the territory
specified in its registration, regardless of the registrant's area of actual
use.93 Through an injunction,94 registration also enables a registrant
to effectively freeze the territorial extent of a nonregistrant's trade-
"[A]pplications for and registrations on the supplemental register shall not be subject to or
receive the advantages of sections 1051(b), 1052(e), 1052(f), 1057(b), 1057(c), 1062(a), 1063 to
1068, inclusive, 1072, 1115 and 1124 of this title." Lanham Act § 26, 15 U.S.C. § 1094. This
includes the prima facie evidentiary presumptions of Sections 7(b) and 33(a), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1057(b), 1115(a), the constructive use provision of Section 7(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c), the
incontestability provisions of Sections 15 and 33(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1065, 1115(b), and the
constructive notice provision of Section 22, 15 U.S.C. § 1072.
93. See In re Beatrice Foods Co., 429 F.2d 466, 474 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (discussing a
registration as having a nationwide effect); 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 26.13, at 313-14 &
n.12 (discussing how registration gives a registrant nationwide protection regardless of the
registrant's area of actual use).
94. Section 32 of the Lanham Act gives a registrant a civil cause of action against a
trademark infringer. Section 32(l)(a) provides:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with
which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive;...
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter
provided.
Lanham Act § 32(l)(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(l)(a) (1988).
Section 34 entitles the registrant to an injunctive remedy. Section 34(a) provides:
(a) The several courts vested with jurisdiction of civil actions arising under this
chapter shall have power to grant injunctions, according to the principles of
equity and upon such terms as the court may deem reasonable, to prevent the
violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in the Patent and
Trademark Office or to prevent a violation under section 1125(a) of this title.
Lanham Act § 34(a), 15 U.S.C. § I116(a).
Unfortunately for the registrant, however, registration does not automatically entitle it to
an injunction. Instead, the registrant must be engaged in the sale of its product such that there
is a present likelihood of confusion between the registrant's and the infringer's products. Dawn
Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 364-65 (2d Cir. 1959).
In Dawn Donut, the plaintiff was the senior user of the trademarks "Dawn" and "Dawn
Donut," which were used in connection with the retail sale of donuts. The senior user first
used the mark in 1922 and registered it under the Lanham Act in 1947. Id at 361-62. The
junior user adopted the mark in 1951. Id at 361. Accordingly, the junior user had construc-
tive notice of the senior user's prior use and could not defend under the Tea-Rose/Rectanus
doctrine.
By the time of the trial, the junior user was operating in a six county area that was sepa-
rate from the senior user's trading area. Id at 360. Even though the junior user adopted its
trademark with constructive notice of the senior user's prior use, the court refused to issue an
injunction. The court stated:
[I]f the use of the marks by the registrant and the unauthorized user are confined
to two sufficiently distinct and geographically separate markets, with no likeli-
hood that the registrant will expand his use into defendant's market, so that no
public confusion is possible, then the registrant is not entitled to enjoin the junior
user's use of the mark....
As long as plaintiff and defendant confine their use of the mark "Dawn" in
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mark rights at the time of the registration." Registration further
confers upon a registrant the benefit of certain evidentiary presump-
tions which facilitate the enforcement of trademark rights.96
Perhaps the original Lanham Act's most significant change9
from common law principles was the constructive notice provision of
Section 22.98 By making registration constructive notice of a regis-
trant's prior use, the Lanham Act eliminated the "good faith and
without knowledge" element of the Tea-Rose/Rectanus defense where
a nonregistrant adopts a mark after the registration was issued.99
Sections 7(b) and 15 give the registrant certain evidentiary pre-
sumptions that facilitate the enforcement of its statutory rights. Sec-
tion 7(b) establishes that a certificate of registration is prima facie
evidence of the validity of the mark, the registration, the registrant's
ownership, and the registrant's exclusive right to use that mark.1oo
These presumptions shift the burden of proof to the nonregistrant on
both the issues of entitlement to a particular trademark and entitle-
ment to a geographical area of operation. 101 The incontestability pro-
vision of Section 15,102 which is available to a registrant who has used
connection with the retail sale of baked goods to their present separate trading
areas it is clear that no public confusion is likely.
Id at 364.
The court held, therefore, that the statutory test of "likelihood of confusion" must be met
in order to grant relief to the registrant and that some judicially cognizable zone of protection
must be invaded before there is such a likelihood of confusion. Id at 365.
95. See 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, §§ 26.18(B), .19. But see Weiner King, Inc. v.
Wiener King Corp., 615 F.2d 512, 525 (C.C.P.A. 1980) ("[We do not believe that a
mechanical approach which always defers to the first to register comprehends all of the factors
which must be taken into account ....").
96. See infra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
97. See 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 26.13(B), at 314 (describing the constructive
notice provision as "'perhaps the greatest single advantage of registration'" (quoting D.
ROBERT, THE NEw TRADE-MARK MANUAL 129 (1947))).
98. Section 22 of the Lanham Act provides: "Registration of a mark on the principal
register .. . shall be constructive notice of the registrant's claim of ownership thereof."
Lanham Act § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1988).
99. See Foxtrap, Inc. v. Foxtrap, Inc., 671 F.2d 636, 640 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
100. Section 7(b) of the Lanham Act provides:
A certificate of registration of a mark upon the principal register provided by this
chapter shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of
the registration of the mark, of the registrant's ownership of the mark, and of the
registrant's exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce on or in
connection with the goods or services specified in the certificate, subject to any
conditions or limitations stated in the certificate.
Lanham Act § 7(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (1988).
101. See, e.g., Natural Footwear Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383, 1399-40 &
n.40 (3d Cir. 1985) (requiring the senior user to prove its area of entitlement in defending
against a suit by a junior user registrant).
102. Section 15 of the Lanham Act provides:
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its mark continuously for a minimum of five years after registration,
further protects a registrant's rights by making these evidentiary pre-
sumptions conclusive, with certain limited exceptions. 103
More recently, the Trademark Revision Act of 1988104 instituted
the new constructive use concept of Section 7(c).105 Under this new
provision, which provides that application for registration constitutes
"constructive use of a mark, conferring a right of priority, nationwide
in effect," the date of the registrant's application for registration-not
the date of registration--determines whether a nonregistrant can rely
on the common law Tea-Rose/Rectanus defense.Y°6  Professor
[E]xcept to the extent, if any, to which the use of a mark registered on the
principal register infringes a valid right acquired under the law of any State or
Territory by use of a mark or trade name continuing from a date prior to the date
of registration under this chapter of such registered mark, the right of the
registrant to use such registered mark in commerce for the goods or services on
or in connection with which such registered mark has been in continuous use for
five consecutive years subsequent to the date of such registration and is still in
use in commerce, shall be incontestible ....
Lanham Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1988).
103. See Lanham Act § 33(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (1988).
To the extent that the right to use the registered mark has become incontestable
under section 1065 of this title, the registration shall be conclusive evidence of
the validity of the registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the
registrant's ownership of the mark, and of the registrant's exclusive right to use
the registered mark in commerce.
Id Additionally, there are eight enumerated exceptions to this conclusive evidentiary pre-
sumption. See Lanham Act § 33(bXl)-(8), 15 U.S.C. §*1115(bXl)-(8). Only Section 33(b)(5)
of the Lanham Act is relevant to this discussion. See infra notes 109 & 112 and accompanying
text.
104. Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127
(1988) (effective Nov. 1[6, 1989)).
105. Section 7(c) of the Lanham Act now provides:
Contingent on the registration of a mark on the principal register provided
by this chapter, the filing of the application to register such mark shall constitute
constructive use of the mark, conferring a right of priority, nationwide in effect,
on or in connection with the goods or services specified in the registration against
any other person except for a person whose mark has not been abandoned and
who, prior to such filing-
(1) has used the mark;
(2) has filed an application to register the mark which is pending or has
resulted in registration of the mark; or
(3) has filed a foreign application to register the mark on the basis of which
he or she has acquired a right of priority, and timely files an application under
section 1126(d) of this title to register the mark which is pending or has resulted
in registration of the mark.
Lanham Act § 7(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (1988).
106. It appears that the new constructive use provision of Section 7(c) of the Lanham Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (1988), operates to eliminate the "remoteness" element of the Tea-Rose!
Rectanus defense in much the same way that the constructive notice provision of Section 22,
15 U.S.C. § 1072, operates to eliminate the "good faith" element. See S. REP. No. 515, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 29, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5577, 5591
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McCarthy explains:
This new concept of a "constructive use" date is in many ways
more potent than, and in many factual situations will make moot,
the effect of the "constructive notice" provision of [Lanham Act]
§ 22, which destroys a junior user's ability to establish the "good
faith" needed to acquire an exclusive territory of use for the mark.
Constructive notice triggered upon registration of the mark will
still operate. But in many situations, it is the "constructive use"
date of application that will govern and decide a territorial priority
battle. The new [Lanham Act] § 7(c) puts the registrant "there" as
if it had actually commenced a commercial level of sales nation-
wide as of the application date, but only for priority purposes.
10 7
Although the original Lanham Act and its subsequent amend-
ments significantly expanded the territorial scope of a registrant's pro-
tection, Subsections 33(a) °8 and 33(b)(5)"°9 incorporate the common
("Constructive use will fix a registrant's nationwide priority rights in a mark from the filing of
its application for registration, whether that application is based on use or intent-to-use.").
Under the common law, if a junior user's first use is within the senior user's zone of
trademark protection, the junior user's first use will not be "remote." See supra note 43 and
accompanying text. In other words, within that geographical area, the senior user has priority
except with respect to users who are more senior to him. Similarly, the constructive use
provision establishes the applicant's priority throughout the United States, except with respect
to users who have used their marks or who have applied to register prior to the applicant's
filing. In both cases, priority within a particular geographical area eliminates the
"remoteness" element of the Tea-Rose/Rectanus defense.
107. 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 26.13, at 91 (2d ed. Supp. 1989).
108. Section 33(a) of the Lanham Act provides:
Any registration issued under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February
20, 1905, or of a mark registered on the principal register provided by this
chapter and owned by a party to an action shall be admissible in evidence and
shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the
registration of the mark, of the registrant's ownership of the mark, and of the
registrant's exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce on or in
connection with the goods or services specified in the registration subject to any
conditions or limitations stated therein, but shall not preclude another person
from proving any legal or equitable defense or defect, including those set forth in
subsection (b) of this section, which might have been asserted if such mark had
not been registered.
Lanham Act § 33(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (1988).
109. Section 33(b)(5) of the Lanham Act provides:
To the extent that the right to use the registered mark has become incontestable
under section 1065 of this title, the registration shall be conclusive evidence of
the validity of the registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the
registrant's ownership of the mark, and of the registrant's exclusive right to use
the registered mark in commerce. Such conclusive evidence shall relate to the
exclusive right to use the mark on or in connection with the goods or services
specified in the affidavit filed under the provisions of section 1065 of this title, or
in the renewal application filed under the provisions of section 1059 of this title if
the goods or services specified in the renewal are fewer in number, subject to any
conditions or limitations in the registration or in such affidavit or renewal
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law Tea-Rose/Rectanus defense and make a registrant's rights subject
to the existing common law rights acquired by nonregistrants' 0 prior
to the registrant's application for registration."' The incontestability
provision of Section 15 and the status of a registrant as either a senior
or junior user determines which of these "defenses" applies." 2 The
impact on the territorial scope of trademark rights under the zones of
application. Such conclusive evidence of the right to use the registered mark
shall be subject to proof of infringement as defined in section 1114 of this title,
and shall be subject to the following defenses or defects:
(5) That the mark whose use by a party is charged as an infringement was
adopted without knowledge of the registrant's prior use and has been
continuously used by such party or those in privity with him from a date prior to
(A) the date of constructive use of the mark established pursuant to section
1057(c) of this title, (B) the registration of the mark under this chapter if the
application for registration is filed before the effective date of the Trademark Law
Revision Act of 1988, or (C) publication of the registered mark under subsection
(c) or section 1062 of this title: Provided, however, That this defense or defect
shall apply only for the area in which such continuous prior use is proved ....
Id § 33(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5).
110. See 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 26.18(D), at 331 (discussing Section 33(a) as
including "the Tea Rose-Rectanus defense with its requirements of 'remoteness' and 'good
faith' "); i § 26.18(C) (discussing the Section 33(bX5) defense as operating as "a kind of
'mini' Tea Rose-Rectanus defense"). For a more thorough discussion of how these provisions
incorporate the common law, see infra note 112.
111. Before the enactment of the Trademark Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667,
102 Stat. 3935 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988)), defenses under
Subsections 33(a) and 33(bX5) of the Lanham Act applied to any nonregistrants who adopted
their marks before a registrant's registration issued. See Burger King, Inc. v. Hoots, 403 F.2d
904, 906 (7th Cir. 1968) (holding that the junior user had a valid defense with respect to the
area in which it operated prior to the senior user's registration, but it did not have a valid
defense with respect to the areas in which it commenced operations after the senior user's
registration).
Under the revised version of Section 7(c), the date of the registrant's application for
registration, and not the date of registration, determines whether the nonregistrant can rely on
the defenses of Subsections 33(a) or 33(b)(5). Lanham Act § 7(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c). For a
discussion of the operation of the constructive use provision of Section 7(c), see supra note 106.
112. There are two basic situations in which a nonregistrant may possess valid trademark
rights: First, a junior user can acquire a valid common law right before the senior user applies
to register its trademark; and second, a junior user who acquires a valid common law right can
register that trademark before the senior user. These scenarios will be referred to as the
"intermediate junior user" and the "junior user registrant" scenarios. In both instances, the
nonregistrant adopts its mark before the registrant has applied to register its mark and,
therefore, before the constructive use provision of Section 7(c) or the constructive notice
provision of Section 22 have taken effect. See Lanham Act §§ 7(c), 22, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1057(c),
1072 (1988). Additionally, the registrant's trademark can be either contestable or
incontestable depending upon whether it can invoke Section 15. Id § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 1065.
If the registered mark has not yet become incontestable, Section 33(a), determines the
respective territorial rights of the parties. Id § 33(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a). In the intermediate
junior user scenario, the junior user adopts its mark after the senior user's first use but before
the senior user applies for registration. In this situation, the junior user is without constructive
notice, and the senior user is without nationwide constructive use. Therefore, the junior user
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protection remains the same, however, regardless of the statutory pro-
may defend on the Tea-Rose/Rectanus "legal defense" pursuant to Section 33(a). See 2 J.
MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 26.18(D), at 331.
Similarly, in the junior user registrant scenario, the senior user, by definition, is a good
faith and remote adopter of the trademark. Therefore, the operation of the constructive notice
and constructive use provisions cannot prevent it from asserting the Tea-Rose/Rectanus
defense under Section 33(a). See id. § 26.19, at 332.
On the other hand, if the registrant's mark has become incontestable, either Section 15 or
Section 33(b)(5) will determine the respective rights of the parties. See Lanham Act §§ 15,
33(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1065, 1115(b)(5). The applicability of these sections depends upon
whether the registrant is the junior or senior user.
In order to use the Section 33(b)(5) defense, a party must be an intermediate junior user.
This is because this section provides that "this defense or defect shall apply only for the area in
which such continuous prior use is proved," and "prior use" is defined as use "from a date
prior to (A) the date of constructive use . . . , (B) the registration of the mark ... if the
application for registration is filed before the effective date of the Trademark Revision Act of
1988, or (C) publication of the registered mark." Id. § 33(bX5), 15 U.S.C. § 11 15(bX5). In
addition, the intermediate junior user must prove that it adopted the mark "without
knowledge" of the registrant's prior use (that is, in good faith) and that it used the mark
"continuously" from a date prior to one of the three dates listed above. Id
There is a question of whether Section 33(b)(5) creates a defense on the merits or merely
eliminates the benefits of an incontestable registration. This is important because the language
of Section 33(b)(5) does not contain a requirement of remoteness. See 2 J. McCARTHY, supra
note 2, § 26.18(C), at 329 (discussing the "missing remoteness requirement"). Section 33(b)
establishes: "To the extent that the right to use the registered mark has become incontestable
under section 1065 of this title, the registration shall be conclusive. evidence-. . . of the
registrant's exclusive right .... " Lanham Act § 33(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b). This suggests
that Section 33(b)(5), which creates an exception to these provisions, merely negates the
conclusive evidentiary presumption and is therefore not a defense on the merits. See 2 J.
MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 26.18(C) (discussing whether this provision creates a defense on
the merits or merely eliminates the conclusive evidentiary effect of incontestability).
However, if Section 33(b)(5) is a defense on the merits, a junior user who adopts its mark
in good faith, but not in a remote area, could be entitled to defend against a registrant's
incontestable mark under Section 33(b)(5) - but not against a contestable mark under Section
33(a). This would have the effect of giving the owner of an incontestible mark less protection
than the owner of a contestable mark.
If it is assumed that Section 33(b)(5) exists to shift the evidentiary presumption rather
than to provide a defense on the merits, an intermediate junior user can negate the
"conclusive" evidentiary presumptions in "the area in which . . . continuous prior use is
proved" if it can establish that it adopted the mark in good faith and that it used the mark
continuously from a date prior to one of the three dates listed above. See Lanham Act
§ 33(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 11 15(b)(5). Once this conclusive evidentiary presumption is negated,
the intermediate junior user can attempt to prove the "good faith" and "remoteness" elements
of the Tea-Rose/Rectanus defense.
If the registrant is the junior user, the defense of Section 33(b)(5) does not apply. Instead,
the incontestability of the junior user registrant's mark is limited by Section 15, which negates
incontestability "to the extent, if any, to which the use of a mark registered on the principal
register infringes a valid right acquired under the law of any State or Territory by use of a
mark or trade name continuing from a date prior to the date of registration." Id § 15, 15
U.S.C. § 1065; see 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 26.19. This has the effect of freezing the
senior user's area of trademark protection to its existing territory at the time the registrant's
registration issued. The end result is analogous to an intermediate junior user defending under
Section 33(b)(5). See id § 26.19, at 333-34.
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cedure that is used to determine those rights.1 3 Furthermore, when a
party has not obtained a federal registration for its mark, Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act 4 provides a federal cause of action for
infringement of a common law trademark.1 5
The Lanham Act also provides for concurrent registration in the
Patent and Trademark Office under Section 2(d). 116 This provision
allows two or more users of the same or similar trademark to obtain
registrations for their respective marks if certain conditions are satis-
fied. First, the user seeking concurrent registration must be either the
senior user or a remote junior user who adopted its mark in good faith
prior to the application of the senior user.1 ' Additionally, a concur-
113. See Lanham Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1988) ("except to the extent, if any, to which
the use of a mark registered on the principal register infringes a valid right acquired under the
law of any State or Territory by use of a mark or trade name continuing from a date prior to
the date of registration"); i § 33(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) ("but shall not preclude another
person from proving any legal or equitable defense"); id § 33(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 11 15(b)(5)
(stating that "this defense or defect shall apply only for the area in which such continuous
prior use is proved").
114. Id. § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
115. See 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 26.18(D), at 331. See generally id §§ 27.2-.3.
116. Section 2(d) of the Lanhan Act provides:
No trade-mark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished
from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on
account of its nature unless it-
(d) Consists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered in
the Patent and Trademark Office, or a mark or trade name previously used in the
United States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in
connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive: Provided, That if the Commissioner determines that
confusion, mistake; or deception is not likely to result from the continued use by
more than one person of the same or similar marks under conditions and
limitations as to the mode or place of use of the marks or the goods on or in
connection with which such marks are used, concurrent registrations may be
issued to such persons when they have become entitled to use such marks as a
result of their concurrent lawful use in commerce prior to ... the earliest of the
filing dates of the applications pending or of any registration issued under this
chapter .... Concurrent registrations may also be issued by the Commissioner
when a court of competent jurisdiction has finally determined that more than one
person is entitled to use the same or similar marks in commerce. In issuing
concurrent registrations, the Commissioner shall prescribe conditions and
limitations as to the mode or place of use of the mark or the goods on or in
connection with which such mark is registered to the respective persons.
Lanham Act § 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1988).
117. See id. Concurrent registration may be granted only to users "entitled to use such
marks as a result of their concurrent lawful use in commerce prior to ... the earliest of the
filing dates of the applications pending or of any registration issued under this chapter." Id.
This requirement is primarily jurisdictional in nature. In re Beatrice Foods Co., 429 F.2d
466, 473 (C.C.P.A. 1970). It follows that this requirement is satified by all senior users, as well
as by any good faith and remote junior user who adopted its mark before the application of the
senior user.
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rent registration may be granted only if there is no likelihood of con-
fusion among the two or more concurrently registered trademarks
within their respective areas of registration.I1 8 If concurrent registra-
tions are granted, the Patent and Trademark Office is required to pre-
scribe restrictions on the respective territories of registration so that
no likelihood of confusion will exist among the marks.1 9
By obtaining concurrent registrations for their marks, multiple
users of the same or similar trademark can enjoy the same evidentiary
presumptions that accompany registration, as well as the benefits of
constructive notice, constructive use, and perhaps, incontestability of
registration.1 20 This enables the multiple registrants to market their
products without the fear that future appropriators will operate
within their respective areas.
Generally, where none of the parties seeking concurrent registra-
tion owns a registration, the senior user is "prima facie entitled to a
registration covering the entire United States."12 1  However, the
senior user's "rights and, therefore, his registration, should be limited
only to the extent that any other subsequent user, who can establish
the existence of rights earlier than the prior user's application for
registration, can also prove a likelihood of confusion, mistake or
deception."1 22 By limiting the territory of the senior user's registra-
tion to the extent of another user's rights, it can be inferred that a
subsequent user is entitled to its common law zones of protection.
1 23
118. See Lanham Act § 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1988). The Commissioner of the Patent
and Trademark Office may issue a concurrent registration only if he determines that
"confusion, mistake, or deception is not likely to result from the continued use by more than
one person of the same or similar marks." Id Alternatively, the Commissioner may also issue
concurrent registrations when a "court of competent jurisdiction has finally determined that
more than one person is entitled to use the same or similar marks in commerce." Id. These
conditions embody the likelihood-of-confusion standard and prohibit concurrent registration
as long as there exists a likelihood of confusion among the several marks. Beatrice Foods, 429
F.2d at 474.
119. See Lanham Act § 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1988) ("In issuing concurrent
registrations, the Commissioner shall prescribe conditions and limitations as to the mode or
place of use of the mark .... "). The conditions and limitations imposed on concurrent
registration embody the likelihood-of-confusion standard. See Beatrice Foods, 429 F.2d at 474
("[T]he extent to which those [concurrent] registrations are to be restricted territorially must
also be governed by the statutory standard of likelihood of confusion.").
120. See supra notes 97-107 and accompanying text.
121. Beatrice Foods, 429 F.2d at 474. But see Nark, Inc. v. Noah's, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 934, 946 (T.T.A.B. 1981) (holding that where neither party held a federal registration,
the junior user was entitled to registration covering the entire United States, less the senior
user's area of entitlement, based upon the theory that the senior user had abandoned its right
to nationwide registration).
122. Beatrice Foods, 429 F.2d at 474.
123. See Nark, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 944.
[I]n a concurrent use situation... the prior user generally is prima facie entitled
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On the other hand, if a junior user has already -obtained a regis-
tration, the junior user may be entitled to a registration covering all of
the United States except for the senior user's common law zones of
protection.124 The policy of rewarding those who first seek registra-
tion and a consideration of the rights created by registration support
the granting of a nationwide registration to such a junior user, 25 but a
mechanical test whereby the first to obtain a registration is entitled to
the unoccupied territory of the United States has been rejected.1 26 In
one instance, however, a junior user who had not yet obtained a regis-
tration was granted a registration covering the entire United States,
less the senior user's area of common law protection, based upon a
theory of abandonment of registration rights.
1 27
III. THE TERRITORIAL EXTENT OF TRADEMARK RIGHTS
This Section focuses on how the courts have confused the theo-
ries of trademark protection. First, the language employed by the
courts provides evidence of this confusion. Courts do not always
clearly explain which of the three theories of protection they are
applying in determining the territorial extent of a user's trademark
rights. This confusion is further reflected by the use of factors mea-
suring different zones of protection within a test for a single zone.
Finally, the courts do not agree on which factors should be considered
within the test for a particular zone. The result is that it becomes
difficult for future courts to apply the tests to new factual scenarios.
This in turn creates inconsistent decisions.
A. Confusion in the Terminology
Perhaps the most commonly confused doctrines are the zone of
actual market penetration and the zone of reputation. This confusion
is reflected by the use of terminology that describes one zone when the
court is actually attempting to analyze the territorial extent of the
other zone. The zone of actual market penetration tests the area of
actual sales and the area in which customers usually reside.1 28 In con-
to a registration covering the entire United States, limited only to the extent that
the junior user can establish that it possesses protectible rights in its area of
actual use as well as in an area of natural expansion; providing that no reasonable
likelihood of confusion or mistake exists or can arise from this geographical split.
Id (emphasis added).
124. Weiner King, Inc. v. Wiener King Corp., 615 F.2d 512, 523 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
125. Id at 523-24.
126. Id at 525.
127. Nark, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 946.
128. For a more detailed discussion of the zone of actual market penetration, see supra
Section II(B)(I).
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trast, the zone of reputation generally delineates an area beyond .,the
zone of actual market penetration. 29  In this zone of reputation,
where the trademark user does not have sufficient market penetration,
but the public nonetheless recognizes the mark either by word of
mouth or by advertisements, the public would be likely to confuse the
legitimate user's mark with the infringer's mark. 130
This confusion is best illustrated in Natural Footwear Ltd. v.
Hart, Schaffner & Marx.' Natural Footwear involved a dispute over
the right to use the trademark "Roots" in connection with the sale of
footwear and wearing apparel. 132 The registrant, the junior user of
the mark, 133 sought to enjoin the senior user from continuing to use
the mark outside the state of New Jersey. 134 The senior user operated
a local "upscale" clothing store135 with a scattering of nationwide
mail-order customers. 136 Although the senior user did not conduct
extensive national advertising, 137 it advertised in local newpapers'
3
1
,and distributed its catalogue throughout the nation.1 39 The senior
user counterclaimed for a permanent injunction against the regis-
trant. 'I The trial court found for the senior user and issued a perma-
nent nationwide injunction against the registrant.
14 1
It is unclear, however, whether the trial court based its decision
on a determination that the senior user had a nationwide zone of rep-
utation or a nationwide zone of actual market penetration. By utiliz-
ing language to describe one zone when that language more
appropriately described the other zone, the court appears to have con-
fused the two doctrines. The court wrote:
129. The zone of reputation and the zone of actual market penetration overlap. Professor
McCarthy observed:
[I]n real markets, such "zones" will not be perfectly symmetrical circles looking
like a bullseye centered on the user's location. Sales, advertising and reputation
zones form complex, overlapping patterns which spread outward territorially at
different distances in different directions. A spreading amoeba is probably a
more accurate picture than a bullseye.
2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 26.12(A), at 309.
130. For a more detailed discussion of the zone of reputation, see supra Section II(B)(2).
131. 760 F.2d 1383 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920 (1985).
132. Id. at 1386.
133. Id. at 1391.
134. Id. at 1393.
135. Id. at 1387.
136. Id. at 1388 & n.6.
137. Id. at 1390.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1388.
140. Id. at 1393.
141. Natural Footwear Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 579 F. Supp. 543, 572 (D.N.J.
1983), rev'd, 760 F.2d 1383 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920 (1985).
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[T]he evidence as. a whole clearly and convincingly shows that
Roots [the senior user] has established and continues to enjoy
unique identification for the wearing apparel (including shoes) sold
by it as merchant, both as a tradename and as a trademark, mainly
in New Jersey but throughout the United States as well, long
before [the registrant's] first shipment of shoes to California in late
December 1973.142
Thus, the court seemed to suggest that the senior user had a
nationwide zone of reputation by describing the senior user's mark as
enjoying a "unique identification . . . throughout the United
States." 143 However, the court also described the product as being
itsold... throughout the United States."'" This suggests that the
senior user had established actual market penetration throughout the
country.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals forthe Third Cir-
cuit perpetuated this confusion. 4 ' The appellate court pointed out
that the trial court had found that the senior user had acquired a
national reputation.'" Throughout its discussion, however, the court
repeatedly used the term "market penetration" without distinguishing
between the zone of actual market penetration and the zone of reputa-
tion. For example, the Third Circuit explicitly described its test as
one of market penetration.
4 7
Similarly, in Sweetarts v. Sunline, Inc. ,148 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit confused the doctrines of the zone
of reputation and the zone of actual market penetration. Sweetarts
involved the right to use the trademark "SweeTarts" in connection
with the sale of candy. 49 The senior user of the mark was a small
Oregon manufacturer of chocolates and toffee who distributed its
product mostly to fraternal organizations through mail-order pro-
grams and through personal solicitations by the company's presi-
dent. 50 In contrast, the junior user was a large candy manufacturer
who distributed its artificially flavored candy tablet throughout the
nation to retail establishments such as supermarkets, drugstores, and
restaurants. '5
142. Id at 570.
143. Ia
144. Id.
145. Natural Footwear Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383 (3d Cir. 1985).
146. Id. at 1394.
147. Id. at 1398.
148. 380 F.2d 923 (8th Cir. 1967).
149. Id. at 924.
150. Id. at 925.
151. Id. at 926.
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On remand from the Eighth Circuit, the trial court found that
the senior user was entitled to protection in several of the states in
which it had claimed trademark rights. 52 Although the trial court
had been explicitly instructed to weigh certain factors in determining
whether there had been actual market penetration,1 5 3 the court's con-
fusing terminology makes it unclear whether the court extended pro-
tection based on the senior user's zone of reputation or its zone of
actual market penetration.
The court seemed to suggest that the senior user's zone of reputa-
tion was the basis for the decision when it noted that the senior user
had "established a reputation for fine candy among its customers 1 1
54
and that the "reputation of 'SweeTarts' [had] also expanded the
[senior user's] sales."155 In the same analysis, however, the court also
suggested that the senior user's market penetration extended to cer-
tain states because the senior user "had significant sales over an
extended period of time." '56
A second common source of doctrinal confusion is illustrated by
cases that have relied on Weiner King, Inc. v. Wiener King Corp.. 157
Weiner King proposed a test 5 8 for determining the respective territo-
ries of registration for parties seeking concurrent registration.1 59 It
has subsequently been interpreted, however, as creating a test for mar-
ket penetration. 60 For example, in Natural Footwear,16' the Third
Circuit described the Weiner King test as "relevant to assessing the
market penetration of a trademark user."'' 62 Still, the Weiner King
test more appropriately measures the territorial extent of the zone of
152. Sweetarts v. Sunline, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 572, 577 (E.D. Mo. 1969), rev'd in part on
other grounds, aff'd in part, 436 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1971).
153. For a discussion of these factors, see infra notes 178-82 and accompanying text.
154. Sweetarts, 299 F. Supp. at 577.
155. Id
156. Id
157. 615 F.2d 512 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
158. Id at 523.
159. Id at 514.
160. See V & V Food Prods. Inc. v. Cachique Cheese Co., 683 F. Supp. 662 (N.D. Ill.
1988). In V & V, the court implicitly made reference to Weiner King: "The court in Natural
Footwear did, however, set forth four factors which are helpful in determining whether a party
has achieved sufficient market penetration in an area to warrant protection of its common law
rights .... Other courts have considered similar factors in determining market penetration."
Id at 668; see also Minuteman Press Int'l, Inc. v. Minute-Men Press, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 426, 432 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (holding that there was legally insufficient "market
penetration under either Beatrice Foods [from which the Weiner King test was derived] or
Sweetarts v. Sunline, Inc.").
161. Natural Footwear Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383 (3d Cir. 1985).
162. Id. at 1398.
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natural expansion. 6 3
B. Confusion in the Test Factors
The factors that the courts have used to define the territorial
extent of the zones of protection need further explanation. The tests
adopted by the Eighth Circuit in Sweetarts 1" and by the Third Cir-
cuit in Natural Footwear 165 focus primarily on the zone of actual mar-
ket penetration. 166 Nonetheless, these tests incorporate some factors
that more appropriately test the zones of natural expansion and repu-
tation.1 67 Similarly, the test adopted by the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals in Weiner King 1 61 (to determine the respective territo-
ries of registration for users seeking concurrent registration) appears
to measure the territorial extent of the zone of natural expansion.
69
The Weiner King test, however, incorporated a factor that expressly
tests the extent of actual market penetration.
1 70
Sweetarts involved a test for actual market penetration.17' The
senior user had attempted to enjoin a junior user who had expanded
into the area claimed by the senior user.1 72 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit granted the injunction as a matter of
law173 in the three states in which the senior user had ninety-five per-
cent of its sales. In contrast, the court refused the injunction in sev-
eral other states because "business transactions have been nonexistent
or so small, sporadic, and inconsequential that present or anticipated
market penetration is di (sic] minimus."'17 A third group of states
remained, however, in which the senior user had transacted "some
163. See infra note 201.
164. Sweetarts v. Sunline, Inc., 380 F.2d 923, 929 (8th Cir. 1967).
165. Natural Footwear, 760 F.2d at 1398-99.
166. See id. at 1398 ("Mhe following four factors should be considered to determine
whether the market penetration of a trademark in an area is sufficient to warrant protection
.... "); Sweetarts, 380 F,2d at 929 (Although "market penetration need not be large to entitle
plaintiff to protection,. . . it must be significant enough to pose the real likelihood of confusion
167. For a discussion of the Sweetarts factors, see infra notes 178-82 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the Natural Footwear factors, see infra notes 192-98 and
accompanying text.
168. Weiner King, Inc. v. Wiener King Corp., 615 F.2d 512 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
169. For a discussion of the Weiner King factors, see infra notes 211-20 and accompanying
text.
170. See Weiner King, 615 F.2d at 523 (testing "possible market penetration by means of
products brought in from other areas").
171. Sweetarts v. Sunline, Inc., 380 F.2d 923, 929 (8th Cir. 1967).
172. Id. at 926.
173. Id at 929.
174. Id.
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measurable business. "175
With regard to this last group of states, the issue was remanded
to determine whether there had been significant market penetration
warranting the protection of the trademark. 176 The court stressed
that the primary concern in determining market penetration was
whether there existed a likelihood of confusion between the two
marks in the geographical area claimed by the senior user. Where
such a likelihood of confusion existed, the senior user was entitled to
an injunction. The court wrote: "Though the market penetration
need not be large to entitle plaintiff to protection,... it must be signif-
icant enough to pose the real likelihood of confusion among the con-
sumers in that area between the products of plaintiff and the products
of defendants."
77
On remand, the trial court was directed to weigh four factors in
its consideration of the senior user's market area. These were: "[one,]
plaintiff's dollar value of sales at the time defendants entered the mar-
ket, [two,] number of customers compared to the population of the
state, [three,] relative and potential growth of sales and [four,] length
of time since significant sales."' 781 The first and second factors, "dol-
lar value of sales" and "number of customers compared to the popula-
tion of the state," test market penetration by comparing the sales of
the product to the size of the relevant market.' 79 Larger states there-
fore require a larger volume of sales before the sales can constitute
sufficient market penetration. The third factor, "relative and poten-
tial growth of sales," focuses on the growth of sales rather than the
user's present market penetration. 80 The fourth factor, "length of
time since significant sales," serves to ensure that the sales of the
trademarked product are both continuous and significant, and not
merely sporadic, in order to establish rights in a given territory. 8'
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. (citing Sweet Sixteen Co. v. Sweet "16" Shop, 15 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1926)).
178. Id.
179. See, e.g., Wrist-Rocket Mfg. Co. v. Saunders Archery Co., 578 F.2d 727, 732 (8th Cir.
1978) (stating that sales figures "must be limited to the particular product market situation
involved").
180. See Sweetarts v. Sunline, Inc., 436 F.2d 705, 709 (8th Cir. 1971) (denying injunctive
relief where the trial record reflected "no potential growth of sales").
181. See, e.g., Sweetarts, 380 F.2d at 929 (holding that the senior user's "business
transactions have been nonexistent or so small, sporadic, and inconsequential that present or
anticipated market penetration is di [sic] minimus"); Quill Corp. v. LeBlanc, 654 F. Supp. 380,
386 (D.N.H. 1987) (stating that "sporadic sales are insufficient to establish the requisite
'continuous prior use' of a trademark necessary to create trademark rights, . . . and the
geographic extent of [the junior user's] customer base"); Thrifty Rent-A-Car Sys. v. Thrift
Cars, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 750, 756 (D. Mass. 1986) (holding that the junior user's sporadic car
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, Arguably, the third factor, which attempts to determine future
sales of a trademarked product, should have no bearing on whether
there is present market penetration. The zone of natural expansion,
however, seeks to define the area in which there is insufficient present
market penetration, but into which the trademark user is likely to
expand in the future. 82 Therefore, "relative and potential growth of
sales" more appropriately speaks to the determination of the zone of
natural expansion.
As in Sweetarts, the court in Natural Footwear also devised a test
for actual market penetration.18 3 The proposed factors, however, test
the territorial extent of all three zones of protection. Furthermore,
although the test was based upon Sweetarts, it fails to utilize all of the
Sweetarts factors without offering reasons for the omissions.184
In Natural Footwear, the junior user registrant sued to enjoin the
senior user from using its mark outside of New Jersey. 8 s Because the
junior user was the registrant, the senior user was required to prove
the territorial extent of its common law trademark rights.18 6 The trial
court granted the senior user a permanent nationwide injunction
based upon a finding that the senior user's rights extended throughout
the United States.
187
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed. 88 The court noted that the trial court had "failed to con-
rentals in the area claimed to be within its area of protection were. "insufficient to establish the
continuous prior use of a trademark that the Lanham Act requires"), aff'd, 831 F.2d 1177 (1st
Cir. 1987).
182. For a more' detailed discussion of the zone of natural expansion, see supra Section
II(BX3).
183. Natural Footwear Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383, 1398-99 (3d Cir.
1985).
184. 111 at 1398.
185. Id at 1393.
186. Id at 1399.
The court applied the Lanham Act's Section 33(b)(5) defense to determine the territorial
scope of the senior user's rights. Id at 1397. The junior user registrant's mark, however, had
not yet become incontestable. Id at 1391 n.18. Technically, the explicit language of the
Section 33(bX5) defense only applies to incontestable registrations. Lanham Act § 33(b)(5), 15
U.S.C. § 1115(bX5) (1988); 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 26.18(D), at 331 ("For marks
whose registrations have not yet become incontestable, § 33(b)(5) is irrelevant."). The court,
therefore, should instead have applied the Section 33(a) defense, which applies to contestable
trademarks. Lanham Act § 33(a), 15 U.S.C. § 115(a); 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2,
§ 26.18(D), at "331 & n. 12. For a more detailed discussion of the applicability of these
defenses, see supra note 112.
187. Natural Footwear Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 579 F. Supp. 543, 572 (D.N.J.
1983). It is not clear from this decision whether the zone of protection extending throughout
the United States was the senior user's zone of reputation or its zone of actual market
penetration. For a discussion of this confusion, see supra notes 131-44 and accompanying text.
188. Natural Footwear, 760 F.2d at 1387.
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sider [the senior user's] market penetration in regard to specific mar-
ket areas" 189 and, furthermore, had failed to consider the senior user's
market penetration in terms of factors relevant to that determina-
tion. I° Citing to both the Weiner King and Sweetarts decisions with
approval,1 91 the Natural Footwear court created its own test for actual
market penetration. It stated:
[T]he following four factors should be considered to determine
whether the market penetration of a trademark in an area is suffi-
cient to warrant protection: (1) the volume of sales of the trade-
marked product; (2) the growth trends (both positive and negative)
in the area; (3) the number of persons actually purchasing the
product in relation to the potential number of customers; and (4)
the amount of product advertising in the area.19 2
Similar to the first two factors in Sweetarts, 93 the first and third
factors in Natural Footwear, "volume of sales" and "number of per-
sons actually purchasing the product in relation to the potential
number of customers," measure the user's market penetration in rela-
tion to the size of the market for the product. 194 Furthermore, the
second factor, "growth trends (both positive and negative) in the
area," suffers from the same flaw as the corresponding factor in
Sweetarts-the factor more properly measures the zone of natural
expansion. 
195
In addition, the court proposed that advertising should be con-
sidered as a factor in the determination of the zone of actual market
penetration. 196 The court found advertising implicit in Weiner King's
"previous business activity" factor' 97 and incorporated it into its own
test "[b]ecause advertising may be very important to the reputation of
a product in a given area."198 This discussion indicates that the court
intended advertising to be used as a factor in the determination of
reputation, but it does not state whether advertising should be used as
a factor in the determination of actual market penetration. Thus, it is
189. Id at 1397.
190. Id at 1398.
191. Id
192. Id at 1398-99.
193. For a discussion of the Sweetarts factors, see supra notes 178-82 and accompanying
text.
194. Natural Footwear, 760 F.2d at 1399.
195. For a discussion of this flaw in the Sweetarts test, see supra text accompanying note
180.
196. Natural Footwear, 760 F.2d at 1399-1400.
197. For a discussion of the Weiner King factors, see infra notes 211-20 and accompanying
text.
198. Natural Footwear, 760 F.2d at 1400.
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unclear whether the court intended this factor to be used in determin-
ing the territorial extent of both zones or only the zone of reputation.
In Weiner King,99 the United States Court of Customs and Pat-
ent Appeals created a test for determining concurrent users' rights to
concurrent registrations in territories outside their areas of actual
market penetration.2 °° This test has been interpreted as a test for the
zone of natural expansion."° Such an interpretation is probably
based upon the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board's statement in
Weiner King that the district court and the court of appeals "[i]n
essence... found facts which established [the junior user registrant's]
zone of potential or natural expansion to be the remainder of the
United States.
20 2
In Weiner King, the junior user had registered its "Wiener King"
mark for hot dog restaurants2 3 and was in the process of rapidly
expanding its operations along the East Coast.2°4 The senior user,
who operated several "Weiner King" hot dog restaurants in New
Jersey,205 sought to cancel the junior user's registration and to obtain
a registration for its own mark covering the entire United States.'
The junior user registrant argued that it was entitled to registration
for all of the United States except for the area occupied by the senior
user at the time the registration was issued.'
In determining the territorial extent of the parties' registrations,
the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals balanced the
equities of the situation.20 8 The court concluded that the rapidly
expanding junior user, who was the first to register its mark, was enti-
tled to registration for the larger unoccupied portion of the United
States °.2 09 An important factor in the court's reasoning was that the
senior user had no apparent desire to expand.2 10 The court also noted
199. Weiner King, Inc. v. Wiener King Corp., 615 F.2d 512 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
200. The Weiner King court derived these five factors from an earlier decision of the United
States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. See In re Beatrice Foods Co., 429 F.2d 466, 475
(C.C.P.A. 1970).
201. See, e.g., Spartan Food Sys. v. HFS Corp., 813 F.2d 1279, 1283 (4th Cir. 1987); Cotton
Ginny, Ltd. v. Cotton Gin, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1347, 1353 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
202. Weiner King, Inc. v. Wiener King Corp., 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 894, 916 (T.T.A.B.
1979).
203. Weiner King, 615 F.2d at 516. Note that the junior user registrant spelled its "Wiener
King" trademark with an "ie," while the senior user spelled its trademark with an lei."
204. Id at 515-16.
205. Id at 515.
206. Id at 516.
207. Id
208. Id at 522.
209. Id at 524.
210. Id at 522.
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that actual market penetration was not necessary to establish trade-
mark rights in a particular area, and it enumerated five factors that
should be considered when granting rights to a party outside its area
of use. The court stated:
[A]ctual use in a territory was not necessary to establish rights in
that territory, and ... the inquiry should focus on the party's (1)
previous business activity; (2) previous expansion or lack thereof;
(3) dominance of contiguous areas; (4) presently-planned expan-
sion; and, where applicable (5) possible market penetration by
means of products brought in from other areas.2"'
On the basis of the overwhelming weight of these factors in favor of
the prior registrant, the court held that the junior user registrant was
entitled to registration for the entire United States, less the senior
user's area of entitlement.212 The court further based its determina-
tion on the policy of rewarding early registration and on consideration
of the existing rights created by the junior user's prior registration.21 3
The first four Weiner King factors, "previous business activ-
ity," 214 "previous expansion or lack thereof, ' 21 5 "dominance of con-
211. Id. at 523.
212. Id.
213. Id at 523-24 (citing In re Beatrice Foods Co., 429 F.2d 466, 474 n.13 (C.C.P.A.
1970)).
214. Id. at 523.
The first factor, "previous business activity," appears to be a nebulous term. It may,
however, encompass the extent of advertising, the number of retail locations, and the volume
of sales. See Spartan Food Sys. v. HFS Corp., 813 F.2d 1279, 1283 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating
that the junior user's "previous business activity has involved only its two restaurants");
Natural Footwear Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383, 1399 (3d Cir. 1985) (stating
that "[t]he extent of advertising is, however, implicit in Weiner King's conclusion that
'business activity' in an area has to be considered").
215. Weiner King, 615 F.2d at 523.
The second factor, "previous expansion or lack thereof," is self-explanatory. Generally,
where no registration has been granted and both parties have demonstrated some degree of
expansion, the senior user is presumptively entitled to a registration covering the entire United
States, less the junior user's zone of protection. See Beatrice Foods, 429 F.2d at 474. Similarly,
where a registration has been issued, the prior registrant is generally entitled to the entire
United States based upon a policy of rewarding those who first seek registration. See Weiner
King, 615 F.2d at 523-24. For example, where a junior user had expanded rapidly while the
senior user had remained static and had not expanded over a reasonable period of time, the
senior user was found to have abandoned its right to nationwide registration of its mark.
Weiner King, Inc. v. Wiener King Corp., 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 894, 910 (T.T.A.B. 1979). The
court stated:
The courts, over the years, have nonetheless recognized that situations may exist
wherein the senior party has, in effect, abandoned or relinquished the right as a
prior user to expand into a particular area or the right to enjoy nationwide
protection for its mark as a result of inactivity over a reasonable period of time,
which would be indicative of a static business, or wherein the senior party has
contracted its trade or has withdrawn from a trading area after the junior party's
use, thereby relinquishing nationwide trademark rights to a junior party that has
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tiguous area, 21 6 and "presently planned expansion,"21 7 all appear to
be relevant to the determination of the territorial extent of the zone of
natural expansion,21 8 because the zone of natural expansion deter-
mines trademark rights outside the user's area of actual market pene-
tration.21 9 However, the fifth factor, "possible market penetration by
means of products brought in from other areas," measures the extent
to which the trademarked product is purchased in one market and
then carried by the consumer to another.22° Therefore, the fifth fac-
tor, which tests market penetration within, and not outside, a particu-
lar geographical area, is not appropriate.
demonstrated substantial expansion activities and a dynamic business save for
the small area or enclave into which the senior party has boxed himself.
Id.; accord Nark, Inc. v. Noah's, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 934, 944 (T.T.A.B. 1981). But see
Tie Rack Enters. v. Tie Rak Stores, 168 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 441, 447 (T.T.A.B. 1970) (holding
that the prior applicant, a junior user who had expanded rapidly after receiving notice of the
senior party's prior use, was not entitled to registration covering the entire United States). The
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board found that the situation in Weiner King could be distin-
guished from the situation in Tie Rack because, unlike the junior user in Tie Rack, the junior
user in Weiner King had already obtained a registration. Furthermore, the Board distin-
guished the situations on the basis that the junior user in Weiner King, unlike the junior user in
Tie Rack, had not sought to gain from the senior user's reputation and, therefore, had not
expanded in bad faith. Weiner King, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 914-15.
216. Weiner King, 615 F.2d at 523.
The third factor, "dominance of contiguous areas," distinguishes between firms that have
geographically contiguous trade areas with a significant amount of market penetration and
firms that have established themselves in scattered areas with a relatively insignificant amount
of market penetration. Compare id at 515-16, 523 (holding that the junior user registrant had
established dominance of contiguous areas where he had expanded his trade area up the east
coast from North Carolina to New Jersey) with Spartan Food, 813 F.2d at 1283 (finding that
where the junior user operated only two facilities in the northern area of Virginia, it had not
established dominance of contiguous areas and, therefore, was not entitled to an injunction
covering the entire state).
217. Weiner King, 615 F.2d at 523.
The fourth factor, "presently planned expansion," is very similar to the second factor,
only it weighs planned future expansion instead of past expansion. See Nark, 212 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) at 939, 946 (granting the junior user, who had little "previous expansion" through
franchising because of a dispute with the senior user, registration for the majority of the United
States because it was engaged in ongoing negotiations for franchises and, therefore, had
significant "presently planned expansion").
218. For a related discussion of how these factors serve to define the zone of natural
expansion, see infra text accompanying notes 247-53.
219. For a more detailed discussion of the zone of natural exapansion, see supra Section
II(B)(3).
220. See, eg., In re Beatrice Foods Co., 429 F.2d 466 (C.C.P.A. 1970). In Beatrice Foods,
the junior user sought registration of its trademark for dairy products in the eastern counties of
Montana. The court remanded to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board for a determination
of the "present penetration into Montana by way of goods bought in the Dakotas." Id at 475.
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IV. DEFINING THE TERRITORIAL EXTENT OF TRADEMARK
RIGHTS
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, at least three different
doctrines and a wide variety of factors are currently being used to
determine the territorial extent of trademark rights. 221 Given the
inconsistencies of the existing tests and the resulting confusion, this
Comment proposes that the distinction between the zone of actual
market penetration and the zone of reputation should be eliminated.
Both test the degree to which consumers recognize a trademark and
are likely to be confused by the marketing of more than one product
under the same or similar mark within a particular geographical area.
Furthermore, both rely upon the same underlying policy considera-
tions. Accordingly, the two doctrines can be logically combined
within one unifying test known as the "zone of consumer recogni-
tion." The third existing doctrine, the zone of natural expansion,
should be retained as a separate measure of the territorial extent of
trademark protection because it addresses considerations other than
the likelihood of confusion. Some specific factors that should be con-
sidered in delineating the territorial extent of these zones of protection
are also proposed. Because no single court has explicitly enumerated
all of the factors suggested in this Comment, the proposal represents a
synthesis of factors both explicit and implicit within various courts'
decisions. Finally, these suggestions are not intended as a complete
and exhaustive listing of all possible factors. Instead, in determining
the territorial extent of the zone of consumer recognition or the zone
of natural expansion, a court should weigh any additional factors that
are appropriate to the particular factual scenario under consideration.
A. Eliminating the Distinction Between the Zone of Reputation
and the Zone of Actual Market Penetration
A thesis of this Comment is that there is no longer a valid reason
to draw a distinction between the zone of actual market penetration
221. This Comment does not attempt to explore the territorial extent of secondary meaning
marks in greater detail than the brief discussion appearing earlier. See supra note 47. Because
the alleged owner of a secondary meaning mark must prove the additional element of
secondary meaning in whatever areas it claims are within its area of trademark protection, see
id., it follows that the geographical scope of secondary meaning marks is less expansive than
that of marks that do not require a showing of secondary meaning. Therefore, the analysis of
Section IV of this Comment remains unchanged for secondary meaning marks, with the caveat
that these marks require additional proof of secondary meaning. As a practical matter,
however, an owner of a secondary meaning mark will not be entitled to a zone of expansion
because this zone, by definition, is outside the zone of consumer recognition. For a discussion
of the zone of consumer recognition, see infra Section IV(B).
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and the zone of reputation. Because both theories are governed by the
likelihood-of-confusion standard,222 a unified test properly reflects this
similarity. Both theories also rely on the same policy considerations.
Therefore, a unified test remains doctrinally consistent with the
existing tests. Finally, from the practical standpoint of determining
the territorial extent of trademark rights, it is easier for a court to
apply a single test.
The link between the theories of actual market penetration and
reputation zones finds its basis in the likelihood-of-confusion stan-
dard.223 Within any given area, the rightful owner of a trademark
must demonstrate a likelihood of confusion in order to obtain an
injunction. Protection of trademark rights is accomplished by award-
ing an injunction to the user whose trademark is infringed.
The zone of actual market penetration reflects the area of actual
sales and the area in which customers who purchase particular goods
usually reside.224 Because the standard for awarding an injunction is
whether a likelihood of confusion exists, any test for actual market
penetration is really a test for likelihood of confusion.225 It follows
that an area of significant market penetration delineates one area in
which there exists a likelihood of confusion and, therefore, an area in
which trademark rights may be protected through an injunction.
Similarly, the area outside the zone of actual market penetration into
which the reputation of a mark has been carried is also protected.226
Again, this area of protection is delineated by determining the territo-
rial area within which a likelihood of confusion exists.227
In addition, the policy considerations for protecting trademark
rights apply to both the zone of actual market penetration and the
zone of reputation. A major purpose of trademark law is to protect
consumers from mistakenly purchasing the wrong product or ser-
vice.228 Trademark law also protects businesses from the fundamental
unfairness of allowing an infringing user to profit from the legitimate
user's efforts.229 What appears to tie these two theories together is the
"consumer recognition" associated with the trademarked product and
222. For a general discussion of the likelihood-of-confusion standard under both the zone of
actual market penetration and the zone of reputation doctrines, see supra Subsections II(B)(I)-
(2).
223. For a discussion of the likelihood-of-confusion standard, see supra notes 17-19 and
accompanying text.
224. For a discussion of the zone of actual market penetration, see supra Section II(B)(1).
225. See supra notes 17-19 & 53 and accompanying text.
226. For a discussion of the zone of reputation, see supra Section II(B)(2).
227. See supra notes 17-19 & 64 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 9 & 11 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
1990]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1075
the potential for injury to both consumers and businesses that results
when consumers mistakenly purchase an infringer's product or ser-
vice. It is only within an area in which consumers recognize a trade-
mark that they can mistake an infringer's trademark with a legitimate
user's mark. Similarly, it is only within an area in which consumers
recognize a trademark that an infringer can profit from the legitimate
user's reputation. Where consumers do not recognize the legitimate
user's mark, they cannot confuse it with the infringer's mark.
In addition, it is often unnecessary to require courts to distin-
guish between the two zones if a single test would suffice. If the sepa-
rate theories of actual market penetration and reputation were used to
determine the territorial extent of trademark protection, a court
would have to apply separate tests to determine each zone in virtually
every case. After all, within some areas of the zone of reputation,
there may be insufficient sales to constitute sufficient market penetra-
tion. Applying a test for market penetration alone could result in the
refusal of an injunction that might have been granted under an alter-
native test. In that event, by allowing an infringing user to operate
within the legitimate user's zone of reputation, the court would be
denying both the consumers and the legitimate user relief from the
injury that results from a likelihood of confusion between marks.2"'
A single test for consumer recognition would make it easier to
apply the test to new factual situations. It would not matter whether
a previous case was decided on a finding of reputation or a finding of
actual market penetration. Both the zones of actual market penetra-
tion and reputation measure the territorial extent of the likelihood of
confusion.231 Similarly, the "zone of consumer recognition" measures
the geographical area in which consumers recognize a mark and,
therefore, would be likely to confuse the marks of the legitimate user
and the infringing user. This is because consumers are likely to con-
fuse the legitimate and infringing marks only if they recogize the legit-
imate mark. Therefore, the zone of consumer recognition also
measures the territorial extent of the likelihood of confusion. It fol-
lows that if an infringing user is operating within either the legitimate
user's zone of actual market penetration or its zone of reputation, the
infringer is also operating within the legitimate user's zone of con-
sumer recognition. By unifying the separate theories, courts can sim-
ply apply a single set of factors that determines whether there will be
a likelihood of confusion.
230. For a discussion of the policy considerations underlying the protection of trademarks,
see supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 224-27 and accompanying text.
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B. The Zone of Consumer Recognition
Once it is realized that the zones of actual market penetration
and reputation both measure consumer recognition, some' factors
must be set out to define the territorial extent of this recognition.
Even if the distinction between the zone of reputation and the zone of
actual market penetration is eliminated, it does not necessarily follow
that factors previously used to determine the territorial extent of
trademark protection should be abandoned. The old tests remain rel-
evant because, like any test for consumer recognition, they determine
whether there is a likelihood of confusion. Accordingly, the separate
tests for the two theories should be combined into one test.
The most important measure of whether consumers within a par-
ticular area are likely to be confused by the availability of more than
one product or service bearing the same or similar trademark is the
extent to which the consumers recognize the mark.23 2 A larger vol-
ume of sales within a particular area suggests that more consumers
have heard of the trademark. Therefore, sales should be considered as
a factor in measuring the territorial extent of the zone of consumer
recognition.
233
In determining whether these sales are significant, they must be
considered in relation to the relevant market for the product. Only
the potential buyers of a product should be considered in determining
whether there has been recognition of the product. This is because a
consumer cannot be damaged by mistaking two products if he is not a
prospective purchaser of either of the two.234 Furthermore, from a
perspective of protecting businesses from the unfairness of trademark
infringement, it is difficult to see how a business is injured when the
consumer who mistakes the legitimate user's product or service with
the infringer's product or service is not a potential buyer.235 It follows
that a smaller potential market requires' fewer sales to create con-
sumer recognition within the smaller group of potential buyers.
Therefore, the size of the market for a particular type of product
should be considered as a factor.236
232. See 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 26.12(A), at 309 ("[C]ustomer recognition is the
primary indicator of one's market area and 'zones of protection' for a mark.").
233. See, e.g., Natural Footwear Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383, 1398-99
(3d Cir. 1985); Sweetarts v. Sunline, Inc., 380 F.2d 923, 929 (8th Cir. 1967).
234. For a discussion of how the protection of trademark rights serves to protect
consumers, see supra notes 9 & 11 and accompanying text.
235. For a discussion of how the protection of trademark rights serves to protect businesses,
see supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
236. See, e.g., Natural Footwear, 760 F.2d at 1399 ("the number of persons actually
purchasing the product in relation to the potential number of customers"); Sweetarts, 380 F.2d
at 929 ("number of customers compared to the population of the state").
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It is generally'accepted that actual confusion among the mem-
bers of the public is strong evidence of the existence of a likelihood of
confusion between the legitimate user's and the infringing user's
marks.237 If consumers actually confuse the legitimate and the
infringing marks, it follows that the consuming public must have rec-
ognized the marks. Therefore, the existence of actual consumer con-
fusion238 within a given territorial area should also be considered as a
factor in determining the geographical extent of the zone of consumer
recognition.
239
Advertising should also be given consideration in determining
consumer recognition because a large amount of advertising in a par-
ticular geographical area may increase trademark recognition. Courts
have held, however, that advertising alone is insufficient to create
trademark rights.240 Perhaps this can be explained because the dollar
amount spent on advertising does not necessarily indicate consumer
recognition and, therefore, a likelihood of confusion. For example,
advertising directed at the wrong group of consumers might not cre-
ate recognition among the potential purchasers of the product. None-
theless, there is support for the use of advertising as a factor in
measuring the territorial extent of consumer recognition, even though
advertising is not sufficient by itself to prove trademark rights.241
Finally, the distance that consumers usually travel to purchase
237. See, eg., World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrell's New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 489
(5th Cir. 1971) (stating that "[t]here can be no more positive or substantial proof of the
likelihood of confusion than proof of actual confusion"); Tisch Hotels, Inc. v. Americana Inn,
Inc., 350 F.2d 609, 612 (7th Cir. 1965) (stating that "since reliable evidence of actual confusion
is difficult to obtain in trademark and unfair competition cases, any such evidence is
substantial evidence of likelihood of confusion").
238. While actual confusion is strong evidence of the existence of a likelihood of confusion,
a lack of actual confusion is not necessarily evidence of a lack of a likelihood of confusion. 2 J.
MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 23.2(C).
239. However, it is important to view evidence of actual confusion in its evidentiary context
because there may not be a causal relation between actual confusion and any similarities in the
trademarks within their geographical areas of use. Id. § 23.2(B). For example, where a
secretary misdirects a letter to the infringing user instead of the legitimate user, or vice versa,
this "evidence" of actual confusion may be the result of mere carelessness on the part of a
secretary rather than the result of any actual confusion of the marks by the secretary. Id. For
a more thorough discussion of the evidentiary problems associated with using evidence of
actual confusion to prove likelihood of confusion, see id.
240. See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. LeBlanc, 654 F. Supp. 380, 386 (D.N.H. 1987) (stating that
"advertising alone or sporadic sales are insufficient to establish the requisite 'continuous prior
use' of a trademark necessary to create trademark rights").
241. Natural Footwear Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383, 1399-1400 (3d Cir.
1985) ("[A]dvertising should be recognized as an independent factor for determining market
penetration."); see also 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 26.6, at 297 ("The combination of
national advertising and ambulating buyers may carry the reputation of a mark into places far
away from the actual outlet.").
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the trademarked product or service should be considered. Depending
upon the nature of the trademarked product, consumers may be will-
ing to travel farther to buy it. For example, customers ordinarily
travel farther to a restaurant or hotel 4 2 than to a donut shop, grocery
store, or fast food restaurant.24 3 The latter types of businesses serve a
more local clientele, while the former generally serve customers who
are willing to travel greater distances to reach them. Therefore,
because consumer recognition extends farther for restaurants and
hotels, a larger area of trademark protection should be granted.
C. The Zone of Natural Expansion
While the factors described above permit a court to delineate a
zone of consumer recognition, a different set of factors is required to
determine the territorial extent of the zone of expansion. This is
because the zone of natural expansion is based upon a policy of grant-
ing expanding businesses room to grow. 2 " In determining the territo-
rial extent of the zone of natural expansion, it must be remembered
that this zone is a legal fiction and, therefore, cannot be measured
with accuracy. 24s In his treatise, Trademarks and Unfair Competi-
tion, Professor McCarthy set forth several guidelines that should be
considered in defining the "imaginary" zone of natural expansion.
These guidelines are:
(1) How great is the geographical distance from the senior user's
actual location to a point on the perimeter of the zone of
expansion?
(2) What is the nature of the business? Does it already have a
large or small zone of actual market penetration or reputation?
(3) What is the history of the ... user's past expansion? Has it
remained static for years, or has it continually expanded into new
territories? Extrapolating prior expansion, how long would it take
the . . . user to reach the periphery of the expansion zone he
claims?
(4) Would it require an unusual "great leap forward" for the...
user to enter the zone, or is the zone so close to existing locations
242. See 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 26.12(D), at 312 ("The trade area for services
such as hotels, motels and restaurants may be very large since purchasers are ambulatory and
on the move. They may carry the reputation of the mark thousands of miles away from the
actual outlet.").
243. See id § 26.12(C), at 311 ("For small, local businesses with a small territory of good
will, two businesses may operate even in the same city with the same mark without causing a
likelihood of confusion.").
244. For a discussion of the policy underlying the zone of natural expansion, see supra note
66 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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that expansion would be (or is) a logical, gradual, step of the same
length as previously made?2'
Several of the factors set forth in Weiner King agree with these
criteria.247 First, the Weiner King factors of "previous expansion or
lack thereof " 24 and "presently planned expansion ' 49 are included in
McCarthy's first and third criteria, which test the user's rate of expan-
sion in relation to the territorial area claimed to be within the zone of
expansion. Similarly, "dominance of contiguous areas,125° another
Weiner King factor, is included in McCarthy's first and fourth crite-
ria. These two criteria test the motives behind the user's claim
regarding the extent of its zone of expansion. Where a user's expan-
sion path is relatively discernible, as evidenced by a steady and evenly
distributed market penetration, there is a lesser likelihood that the
user was trying to "box in" the other user's territory.25' Similarly, it
is more likely that a user showing dominance of contiguous areas is
expanding in good faith if it claims an expansion zone just outside its
area of consumer recognition.252
Finally, the "previous business activity125 3 factor set forth in
Weiner King is relevant to a determination of the territorial extent of
the zone of expansion, as suggested by McCarthy's second criterion.
For example, a large company will have more "business activity" and,
arguably, a larger zone of expansion than a smaller business. This is
because the same growth rate in both a large company and a small
company will result in a larger absolute growth for the larger com-
pany. In other words, if both companies are expanding their opera-
tions territorially at the same percentage rate, the larger company will
expand over a larger area within a given period of time. Nonetheless,
absolute growth rate does not always translate into territorial growth
because a larger company may be concentrating on increasing its mar-
ket share within the existing market area rather than on expanding
the territorial area in which it makes sales. Additionally, advertising
should also be considered as part of "previous business activity."
246. 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 26.9.
247. Weiner King, Inc. v. Wiener King Corp., 615 F.2d 512, 523 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
248. Id. For a discussion of the "previous expansion or lack thereof" factor, see supra note
215.
249. Weiner King, 615 F.2d at 523. For a discussion of the "presently planned expansion"
factor, see supra note 217.
250. Weiner King, 615 F.2d at 523. For a discussion of the "dominance of contiguous
areas" factor, see supra note 216.
251. See supra note 215.
252. See Weiner King, 615 F.2d at 523 (holding that the junior user registrant had
established "dominance of contiguous areas").
253. Id. For a discussion of the "previous business activity" factor, see supra note 214.
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This is because advertising in an area before actual sales commence is
often indicative of the trademark user's plan to expand into that area
in the near future.
V. CONCLUSION
The determination of the territorial extent of trademark rights
has been a source of much confusion among the courts. The leading
judicial opinions have confused both the doctrine and the factors used
in determining the territorial extent of the three zones of trademark
protection. To resolve this confusion, it is important for the courts to
pay strict attention to the terminology used to describe why a particu-
lar area is protected from trademark infringement. This will serve to
decrease confusion in future decisions.
This Comment suggests that the distinction between the zone of
actual market penetration and the zone of reputation is no longer nec-
essary. Accordingly, a uniform set of factors can be devised to deline-
ate the zone within which a trademark is protected due to consumer
recognition of the mark. In determining the territorial extent of this
zone of consumer recognition, courts should consider five factors: the
sales of the trademarked product or service, the size of the relevant
market, evidence of actual confusion, the amount of advertising, and
the distance ordinarily travelled to purchase the product or service.
Finally, in determining the zone of natural expansion, factors that
measure the historical growth of a company, the motives for expan-
sion, and the likelihood of reaching an area claimed to be within the
zone of expansion should be considered. Adoption of these proposed
factors would likely decrease the confusion that is rampant in trade-
mark law today. Finally, use of these proposed factors would enable
courts to more easily apply the doctrine from prior cases to new fac-
tual situations.
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